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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

KAPILA

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1852.

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THE

SÁNKHYA APHORISMS

OF

KAPILA

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to the illustrious sage Kapila !*

b. Well, the great sage Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the *excellence* of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares, as follows, the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain].†

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed.

Aph. 1.—Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

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* श्री कपिलमुनये नमः ॥

† अथ जगदुद्दिधीर्षुर्महामुनिः कपिलः फलसौन्दर्य-ज्ञानस्य फलेच्छाद्वारा साधनप्रवृत्तौ कारणत्वं पश्यन् फल-सौन्दर्यमाह ॥

a. The word 'Well' serves as a benediction*[—the particle *atha* being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds—viz. (1) due to one's self *(ádhyátmika)*, (2) due to products of the elements *(ádhibhautika)*, and (3) due to supernatural causes *(ádhidaivika)*—, is the *complete* end of man, he means to say that it is the *chief* end of man among the four human aims [—viz. merit, wealth, pleasure, and *liberation*,—see *Sáhitya Darpaṇa* §2,—]† because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is *not* transitory :—such is the state of the case.

A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

c. But then, let it *be* that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man, still, what reason is there for betaking oneself to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are *easy* remedies for bodily pains, viz. drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz. beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz. the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz. gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.,—and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of successive births, it must be still *more* hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]?—therefore [—i. e. seeing that this may be asked—] he declares as follows* :—

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* अथ शब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥

† त्रिविधस्य आध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकरूपस्य दुःखस्य अत्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थेषु मध्ये श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थ इत्यर्थः। त्रयाणां क्षयित्वान्मोक्षस्याक्षयित्वादिति भावः ॥

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ २ ॥

The end is not to be attained by ordinary means.

Aph. 2.—The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [—such as wealth, &c.—], for we see [—on the loss of wealth, &c.—] the restoration [of the evil] after its cessation.

a. 'The visible'—in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned† [§1. *c*].

b. 'The effectuation of this'—i. e. the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.‡

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* नन्वस्तूक्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थस्तथापि सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिरूपतत्त्वज्ञानहेतुशास्त्रप्रवृत्तौ को हेतुः शारीरदुःखनिवर्त्तकानामौषधादीनां मानसदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां वरस्त्रीमिष्टान्नादीनां आधिभौतिकदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां नीतिशास्त्रोपदिष्टनिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादीनां आधिदैविकदुःखनिवर्त्तकानां मणिमन्त्रमहौषधादीनां सुकराणां सत्त्वेनानेकजन्मपरम्परायाससाध्ये तत्त्वज्ञानेऽतिदुष्करे प्रवृत्तेर्दुर्लभत्वेन शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेर्दुर्लभतरत्वादत आह ॥

† दृष्टादुक्तौषधादिरूपात् ॥

‡ तत्सिद्धिः दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिसिद्धिः ॥

c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation,—the cessation of *pain* is understood,—we see its restoration,—the springing up again of pain in general* [—from whichever of its three sources—§1 *b*].

d. The state of the matter is this:—not by the expedients abovementioned is there such a removal of pain that no pain arises thereafter; for when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be *not* easy [§1. *c.*], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] *is* to be desired.†

e. But then,—Grant that *future* pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove *present* pain], still, by again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of *future* pain also:—this doubt he states as follows:‡—

प्रात्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत्तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means.

Aph. 3.—[Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain—may result] from exertions for

* न भवति कुतः। निवृत्तेर्दुःखनिवृत्तेरनन्तरमिति शेषः अनुवृत्तिदर्शनात्। दुःखजातीयोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्॥

† अयं भावः। नोक्तैरुपायैर्दुःखानुत्पत्तिविशिष्टा दुःखनिवृत्तिर्भवति तत्तदुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखेषु नष्टेष्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् तस्मादसुकरत्वेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानमेषितव्यमिति॥

‡ ननु मा भूदौषधादिभिर्भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिः तथापि पुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकरणे तु भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिरपि स्यादिति शङ्कते।

the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

a. When pain shall arise, [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain, just as one should eat when there is hunger, and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz. the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognised decision.*

सर्वासम्भवात्सम्भवेऽपि सत्त्वासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुशलैः ॥ ४ ॥

This suggestion negatived.

Aph. 4.—This [method of palliatives, §3], is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this *were* possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians &c., would not be advisable] even if there were the possibility,—i. e. even if these *were* [always at hand], since physicians are not *perfect* [in their art],—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c.; moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is *mental*, &c., so that there is not [under such circumstances] in every respect liberation from pain;—for these reasons *such* a soul's aim [as that which con-

* यदा दुःखमुत्पत्स्यते तदा तत् प्रतिकर्त्तव्यं तथाच दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थः यथा यदा क्षुत्तदा भोक्तव्यं भुञ्जानस्य क्षुन्निवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थ इति सिद्धान्तयति॥

tents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidences* [—i. e. who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof† [of his assertion].

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

Scriptural evidence in favour of this view.

Aph. 5.—Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of scripture declaratory] of its pre-eminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§1. *c.*], since Liberation (*moksha*), by being eternal, is transcendant as a remover of all pains. Moreover one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [—i. e. of Liberation—] because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour] in the text "There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul‡ [—with the utter exclusion of pain]."

* नहि सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वस्मिन् काले वैद्यादयस्सन्ति। सम्भवे ऽपि सत्त्वे ऽपि वैद्यादीनां सत्त्वाभावात्। नहि वैद्यादिभिरपि अवश्यमोषधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते। किञ्च शारीरदुःखापगमे मानसादेस्तस्य सम्भव इति न सर्वथा दुःखाद्विमोकः। तस्मात्प्रमाणकुशलैरीदृग्विधपुरुषार्थो हेय इति ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ न तैस्तैरुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखोच्छेदे यतितव्यं मोक्षस्य नित्य-

b. But then, [it may be suggested]—when you say *liberation*, we understand you to mean from *bondage*; and is that bondage essential, or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself [like any other adventitious and therefore transitory thing]:—what have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies as follows*.

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ ६ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 6.—And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitions, [—supposing it were either;—see §19. *b.*]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place and how the liberation takes place.†

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of]

त्वेन सर्वदुःखोच्छेदरूपत्वेनोत्कर्षात्। आत्मलाभात्परं न विद्यत इति सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेरपि तत्साधने तत्त्वज्ञान एव यतितव्यम् ॥

* ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते बन्धादिति प्रतीयते। सच बन्धः किं स्वाभाविक उतागन्तुकः। आद्ये नाशायोगः अन्त्ये चेत्स्वत एव नंक्ष्यति किं तत्त्वज्ञानेनेत्यत आह ॥

† उभयोः बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकागन्तुकत्वयोर्मोक्षस्योपादेयत्वे अविशेषः। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तिर्यथाच मोक्षस्य तथा वयं वक्तुं शक्नुम इत्यर्थः ॥

Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being *essential** [§5 *b*].

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ ७ ॥

Liberation must be possible, else the means would not have been enjoined.

Aph. 7.—There would be no fitness in the enjoining of means for the liberation of him who is bound *essentially*.

a. Since Liberation has been stated [§1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain:—and this is not *essential* in man; for, if that were the case, then there would be no rule—i. e. no fitness—in the scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation;—such is what must be supplied [to complete the aphorism],—because—to explain our meaning [—by an illustration],—*fire* cannot be liberated from its *heat* which is essential to it,—since that which is *essential* exists as long as the substance exists.†

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the *I'śwara Gítá*,], "If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable,

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* अथ बन्धमोक्षयोरुपपत्त्यर्थं आदौ तावत्स्वाभाविकत्वे बन्धस्य दूषणान्याह ॥

† दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेर्मोक्षत्वाद्बन्धो दुःखयोगः । सच पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः तथा सति मोक्षाय साधनोपदेशस्य श्रौतस्य स्मार्त्तस्यच विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः । नह्यग्नेः स्वाभाविकादौष्ण्यान्मोक्षस्सम्भवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादिति भावः ॥

then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births."*

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] "*Grant* that there is no fitness [in the scriptural and legal injunctions—§7. *a.*],—what have we to do with *that?*"—therefore he declares as follows:—†

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ८ ॥

Scripture would be nugatory if pain were inevitable.

Aph. 8.—Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by inappropriateness, [would be chargeable against the scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say,—since the essential nature of any thing is imperishable,—i. e. endures as long as the thing itself,—it would follow [—on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity—] that, since Liberation is *impossible*, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is inappropriate‡ [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question,—Scripture being assumed here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then, [some one may say]—let it *be* an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object] on the

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* उक्तञ्चेश्वरगीतायां । यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात्स्वभावतः । नहि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपीति ॥

† भवत्वननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत आह ॥

‡ स्वभावस्यानपायित्वाद्यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वान्मोक्षासम्भवेन तत्साधनोपदेशश्रुतेरननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

mere strength of Scripture :* [—and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question *why* the injunction is given :—] to this he replies as follows :—

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टे ऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥

An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9.—There is no rule where something impossible is enjoined; though it *be* enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness or propriety in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit, seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered, [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the *semblance* of an injunction ;—because it stands to reason that not even the *Veda* can make one see sense in an absurdity :—such is the meaning.†

b. Here he comes upon a doubt.‡

शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्चेत्॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removeable.

Aph. 10.—If [some one says]—as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [—something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

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* ननु श्रुतिबलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यात्तत्राह ॥

† अशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठानं न सम्भवति यत उपदिष्टे विहिते ऽपि अशक्योपायेन उपदेश एव न भवति किन्तूपदेशाभास एव। बाधितमर्थं वेदो ऽपि न बोधयतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र शङ्कते।

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue]—the destruction even of what is essential [—in spite of what is stated under § 7—] *is* seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it *were* essential. So too there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well—*if* [any one argues thus] ;—such is the meaning* [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply.]

b. He declares† [the real state of the case with reference to the doubt just raised].

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥ ११ ॥

Decision that an essential property may be hidden but not removed.

Aph. 11.—Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something *impracticable* that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].

a. In regard even to the two examples abovementioned [§ 10] people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]

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* ननु स्वाभाविकस्याप्यपायो दृश्यते यथा शुक्लपटस्य स्वाभाविकं शौक्ल्यं रागेणापनीयते यथाच बीजस्य स्वाभाविकाङ्कुरशक्तिरग्निनापनीयते। अतश्शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्च स्वाभाविकस्यापि बन्धस्यापायः पुरुषे सम्भवतीति तद्वदेव तत्साधनोपदेशः स्यादिति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [—the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating—see § 10. *a.*—] there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the *hiding* of the whiteness, &c., but not the *removal* of the whiteness or of the power of germination;—because—that is to say—the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth,] and by the will of the *Yogí* [—the possessor of supernatural powers,—in the case of the roasted seed—] &c.*

b. Having thus disproved the notion that Bondage is *essential* [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] *cause*, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time &c.†

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १२ ॥

Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

Aph. 12.—Not from connection with *time* [does bondage befall the soul], because this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternally associated [with *all*, and not with those alone who are in bondage].

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* उक्तदृष्टान्तयोरपि अशक्याय स्वाभाविकायोपदेशो लोकानां न भवति। कुतः। शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां दृष्टान्तद्वये शुक्लत्वादेराविर्भावतिरोभावावेव भवतः नतु शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चापायः। रजकादिव्यापारैर्योगिसङ्कल्पादिभिश्च रक्तपटभृष्टबीजयोः पुनश्शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चाविर्भावादिति भावः॥

† एवं बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकत्वं निराकृत्य नैमित्तिकत्वमपि निराकरिष्यन्निमित्तानि कालादीनि निराकरोति॥

a. The bondage of man is not caused by *time*, because [if that were the case] there could be no such separation as that of the *liberated* and *un-liberated*, because time, which applies to everything and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men* [—and must therefore bring *all* into bondage if any].

न देशयोगतो ऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥

Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

Aph. 13.—Nor [does bondage arise] from connection with *place* either, for the same reason.

a. That is to say,—bondage does not arise from connection with *place*. Why? 'For the same reason,'—i. e. for that stated in the preceding aphorism,—viz. that, since it [viz. place] is connected with *all* men, whether liberated or not liberated, bondage would [in *that* case] befal the *liberated* also.†

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः ॥ १४ ॥

The soul is not kept in bondage by its being hampered among circumstances.

Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by surrounding it], because *that* is the habit [not of the soul but] of the *body*.

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* न कालनिमित्तकः पुरुषस्य बन्धः व्यापिनो नित्यस्य कालस्य सर्वैः पुरुषैस्सर्वकालावच्छेदेन सम्बन्धात् मुक्तामुक्तव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः॥

† देशयोगतो ऽपि न बन्धः। कुतः। अस्मात्। पूर्वसूत्रोक्तात्। मुक्तामुक्तसर्वपुरुषसम्बन्धात् मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः॥

a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from *that*, because *that* is the property of the *body* [and not of the soul];—because—that is to say—bondage might befal even the liberated [—which is impossible—] if that which is the habit of another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.*

b. But then [some one might say,] *let* this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes] he declares :†—

असङ्गोऽयम्पुरुष इति ॥ १५ ॥

The soul is altogether solitary.

Aph. 15. [It is not so] because this soul is unassociated [with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds].

a. The word *iti* here shows that it [i. e. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a *reason*,—the construction, with the preceding aphorism, being this, that, *since* the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be [hampered] among circumstances ‡

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १६ ॥

The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.

Aph. 16.—Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work, because these are the property of another, and because it would be eternal [if the case were as you imagine].

a. That is to say,—moreover the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden, because works are the property of another, i. e. not the property of the soul [but of the mind]; and if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befal even the liberated* [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the *associate* [—viz. the mental organ];—so, with allusion to this, he states another reason,—'and because it would be eternal'—i. e. because bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, would occur [where it does not] even in such cases as the universal dissolution† [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ but *not* the soul].

A doubt whether the bondage also belong not to something else than the soul.

c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case then let the bondage too, in the shape of connection with pain, belong [not to the *soul* but] to the *mind* alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which

* अवस्था। संघातविशेषरूपता। ततो न बन्धः। तस्याः देहधर्मत्वात्। अन्यधर्मस्य साक्षादन्यबन्धकत्वे मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरिति भावः॥

† ननु पुरुषस्यैवावस्था स्यात्तत्राह॥

‡ इतिर्हेतौ। पुरुषस्यासङ्गत्वादवस्थाया देहमात्रधर्मत्वमिति पूर्वसूत्रेणान्वयः॥

* न विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्धः कर्मणोऽन्यधर्मत्वादनात्मधर्मत्वादित्यर्थः। अन्यधर्मेण साक्षादन्यस्य बन्धे च मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेः॥

† ननु स्वोपाधिकर्मणा बन्धाङ्गीकारे नायं दोष इत्याशयेन हेत्वन्तरमाहातिप्रसक्तेश्चेति। प्रलयादावपि दुःखयोगरूपबन्धापत्तेश्चेत्यर्थः॥

it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection of the *mind*, why is bondage [i. e. connection with pain] assumed of the *soul* also? With reference to this doubt he declares as follows:—*

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १७ ॥

Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong.

Aph. 17.—If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

a. If bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, were the property of another, i. e. a property of the *mind*, there could be no such thing as diverse experience,—there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain and another man's not [—for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of *mind* but of *soul* that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different—]; therefore it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a *reflection* of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism], and this reflection is of its *own* attendant [organism] only, so that there is no undue result† [deducible from our theory.]

* नन्वेवं दुःखयोगरूपोऽपि बन्धः कर्मसामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधेन चित्तस्यैवास्तु दुःखस्य चित्तधर्मतायाः सिद्धत्वाच्च किमर्थं पुरुषस्यापि कल्प्यते बन्ध इत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

† दुःखयोगरूपबन्धस्य अन्यधर्मत्वे चित्तधर्मत्वे विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः कश्चिदेव दुःखभोक्ता कश्चिन्नेति विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः। अतः पुरुषेऽपि दुःखयोगः स्वीकार्यः। स च दुःखप्रतिविम्बरूप एव प्रतिविम्बश्च स्वोपाधेरेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥

b. He rejects also the notion that Nature *(prakriti)* is *directly* the cause of bondage.*

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्याऽपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

Aph. 18.—If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature as its cause, [then I say] no,—[because] that also is a dependant thing.

a. But then [some one may say] let bondage result from *Nature* as its cause:—if you say so, I say no,—because that also, i. e. Nature also, is dependant on the *conjunction* which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism,—because if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage even *without* that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution† [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be *nibandhaná* [in the 1st case and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows:—"If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature," &c.‡

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage only

* साक्षात्प्रकृतिनिमित्तकत्वमपि बन्धस्यापाकरोति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिनिमित्ताद्बन्धो भवत्विति चेन्न यतस्तस्यापि प्रकृतेरपि उत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणसंयोगपारतन्त्र्यं तेन विनापि बन्धकत्वे प्रलयादावपि बन्धप्रसङ्गात् ॥

‡ निबन्धना चेदिति पाठे प्रकृतिनिबन्धना बद्धता चेदिति योज्यं ॥

as depending on something else [—i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is *reflectional,*—like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire,* [—water being held to be essentially cold, and only to *seem* hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle† [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter,—for there are more to come].

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते ॥ १९ ॥

What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

Aph. 19.—But not without the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] is there the connection of that [i. e. of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof,—i. e. without the conjunction of Nature,—there is not to the soul any connection with that,—i. e. any connection with bondage :—but, moreover, just through that [connection with Nature] does bondage take place.‡

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflectional [—and not inherent in it either essentially or adventitiously—] he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative [—" not without"]. For if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [—in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking—], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom [—as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished,—whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs *not without* the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflectional, and neither essential [§5. *b.*] nor adventitious* [§11. *b*].

c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiśeshikas—viz. [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§19]. That is to say,—as the connection of *colour* with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [—the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal—], just so the connection of *pain* with the soul, essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate. That is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise *spontaneously*† [—any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

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* अतो यत्परतन्त्रा प्रकृतिर्बन्धकारणम्भवेत् तस्मादेव संयोगविशेषादौपाधिको बन्धो ऽग्निसंयोगाज्जलौष्ण्यवदिति ॥

† स्वसिद्धान्तममुनैव प्रसङ्गेनान्तराल एवावधारयति ॥

‡ तद्योगादृते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरुषस्य तद्योगो बन्धसम्पर्को ऽस्ति । अपितु तत एव बन्धः ॥

* बन्धस्यौपाधिकत्वलाभाय नञ्द्वयेन वक्रोक्तिः । यदि हि बन्धः पाकजरूपवत्प्रकृतिसंयोगजन्यः स्यात्तदा तद्वदेव तद्वियोगे ऽप्यनुवर्त्तेत । अतः प्रकृतिवियोगे बन्धाभावादौपाधिक एव बन्धो नतु स्वाभाविको नैमित्तिको वेति ॥

† वैशेषिकाणामिव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग इति भ्रमो मा भूदित्येतदर्थं नित्येत्यादि । यथा स्वभावशुद्धस्फटिकस्य

d. This has been declared in the *Saura* as follows:—"As the pure crystal is regarded by people as red in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul* [is regarded as being affected by pain]."

e. In that [aphorism 19] the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from *real* pain:—that is to say, the connection with pain in the shape of a *reflection* is not a real bondage† [any more than the reflection of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means that the cause of its bondage is just a particular *conjunction* [§19. *c.*],—and now enough as to that point.‡

रागो न जवायोगं विना घटते तथैव नित्यशुद्धादिस्वभावस्य पुरुषस्योपाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगो न घटते। स्वतो दुःखाद्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः॥

* तदुक्तं सौरे। यथाहि केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः। रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत्परमपूरुष इति॥

† तत्र नित्यशुद्धत्वं सदा पुण्यपापशून्यत्वं। नित्यबुद्धत्वं अलुप्तचिद्रूपत्वं। नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदा पारमार्थिकदुःखायुक्तत्वं। प्रतिविम्बरूपदुःखयोगस्त्वपारमार्थिको बन्ध इति भावः॥

‡ तथाच संयोगविशेष एवात्र बन्धहेतुतया सूत्रकृदभिप्रेत इत्यलम्॥

g. Now he rejects [§18. *d.*], certain causes of [the soul's] bondage preferred by others.*

नाविद्यातो ऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात्॥ २०॥

The Vedantic tenet on this point disputed.

Aph. 20.—Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c.,† [—§12—which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one,—see *Vedánta-Sára* §20. *b*], because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind;—because, that is to say—the binding of any one with a rope merely *dreamt* of was never witnessed.‡

c. But if 'Ignorance' *be* a reality [as some assert], then he declares as follows.§

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* इदानीमन्याभिप्रेतान् बन्धहेतून् निरस्यति॥

† अपिशब्दः पूर्वोक्तकालाद्यपेक्षया॥

‡ अविद्यातो ऽपि न साक्षाद्बन्धयोगो ऽद्वैतवादिनां तेषामविद्याया अप्यवस्तुत्वेन तया बन्धानौचित्यात्। नहि स्वप्नरज्ज्वा बन्धनं दृष्टमित्यर्थः॥

§ अविद्याया वस्तुत्वे त्वाह॥

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ २१ ॥

The Vedántí cannot evade the objection without stultifying himself.

Aph. 21. If it [‘Ignorance’] *be* [asserted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

a. That is to say;—and if you agree that ‘Ignorance’ *is* a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyáya Aphorisms §31—] of the un-reality of ‘Ignorance’,* [—and so you stultify yourself].

b. He states another objection.†

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ २२ ॥

The Vedántí cannot evade the objection without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22. And [if you assume ‘Ignorance’ to be a reality, then] there would be a *duality* through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of *non-duality* cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say,—if ‘Ignorance’ is real and without a begining, then it is eternal and coordinate with Soul:—if [therefore] it be *not* soul, then there is a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish] because these followers of the *Vedánta*, asserting *non-duality*, hold that there is neither a duality through

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* यदि चाविद्याया वस्तुत्वं स्वीक्रियते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्याविद्यावृतत्वस्य हानिरित्यर्थः ॥

† दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

there being something of the same kind [with soul] nor through there being something of a different kind.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ २३ ॥

The Vedántí must not allege that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal.

Aph. 23. If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding ‘Ignorance,’ that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [—then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is,—if [the Vedántí says that] ‘Ignorance’ is not *real*, else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow]; and moreover it is not *unreal*, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal‡ [like Plato’s ὀν και μη ὀν—see *Vedánta-sára* §21].

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः ॥ २४ ॥

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* यद्यविद्या वस्तुभूता अनादिस्तदा नित्या आत्मतुल्या। अनात्मत्वे विजातीयद्वैतत्वं। ते हि वेदान्तिनो ऽद्वैतवादिनस्सजातीयविजातीयद्वैताभावं मन्यन्त इति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ अविद्या न सती येन विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः। नाप्यसती कार्योपलम्भात्। किन्तु सदसद्रूपा चेदित्यर्थः ॥

There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal.

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal, we say] no,—because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say,—it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing' &c.,—because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an *example* of the thing [—i. e.—see Nyáya Aphorisms §25—a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present—], and, as regards *your* opinion, such is not to be found [—for, where is there any thing in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]—such is the import.*

b. Again he ponders a doubt.†

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥

A question whether the Vedánti is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate—] "*We* are not asserters of any Six Categories like the *Vaiśeshikas* and others."

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* सदसद्रूपा अविद्येति न युक्तमित्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह ताद्दगिति। सदसद्रूपस्य कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्याप्रतीतेः। विवादास्पदे हि वस्तुनि दृष्टान्त आवश्यकः सच भवन्मये ऽप्रसिद्ध इति भावः॥

† पुनः शङ्कते॥

a. "We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [—like the *Vaiśeshikas* who arrange all things under six heads, and the *Naiyáyikas* who arrange them under sixteen—]; therefore we hold that there *is* such a thing—unknown though it be [to people in general]—as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it] which differs at once from the real and the unreal [—see *Vedánta-sára* §21—], because this is established by proofs,* [scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to *us*, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition,"—see Nyáya Aphorisms §35].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others,' are meant the *Naiyáyikas,* for the *Naiyáyika* is an asserter of sixteen categories,† [—see Nyáya Aphorisms §1].

c. He confutes this‡ [pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya].

अनियतत्वे ऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहो ऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

Aph. 26. Even although this be not fixed [that the categories are six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like.

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* न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिनः। अतो ऽप्रतीतो ऽपि सदसदात्मकः सदसद्विलक्षणो वा अविद्यापदार्थ इत्यङ्गीकुर्मः मानसिद्धत्वात्॥

† आदिपदान्नैयायिकः सहि षोडसपदार्थवादीति॥

‡ परिहरति॥

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Nyáya—§25], still, since *being* and *not-being* are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,—contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like;—such is the meaning.*

b. Certain heretics [—deniers of the authority of the Vedas—] assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration [individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned. This he objects to as follows:†—

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तको ऽप्यस्य ॥ २७ ॥

The heretical theory of a succession of objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Thereof,'—i. e. of the soul. An eternal influence of objects,—an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape

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* पदार्थनियमो मास्तु तथापि भावाभावविरोधेन अयौक्तिकस्य युक्तिविरुद्धस्य सदसदात्मकपदार्थस्य संग्रहो भवद्वचनमात्राच्छिष्याणां न सम्भवति अन्यथा बालकाद्युक्तस्याप्ययौक्तिकस्य संग्रहः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

† केचिन्नास्तिका आहुः सन्ति बाह्यविषयाः क्षणिकाः तेषां वासनया जीवस्य बन्ध इति तद्दूषयति ॥

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of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by *this* either is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned;—such is the meaning.*

b. He states the reason of this† [impossibility].

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरञ्ज्योपरञ्जकभावो ऽपि देशव्यवधानात् स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ २८ ॥

A thing cannot act where it is not.

Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion as well as in yours apparently] between the external and the internal there is not the relation of the influenced and the influencer, because there is a local separation, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus *within* cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an *external* object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra;—such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (*vásaná*) is seen only when there is conjunction,—such as that of madder and the cloth [—to which it gives its colour—], or that of flowers and the flower-basket‡ [—to which they impart their odour.]

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* अस्यात्मनः । अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाहरूपेणानादिकार्य्या विषयवासना तन्निमित्तको ऽपि बन्धो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

‡ तन्मते परिच्छिन्नो देहान्तरस्थ एवात्मा तस्याभ्यन्तरस्य

b. By the word 'Also,' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects—see §15—], &c., which he himself holds, is connected* [with the matter of the present aphorism].

c. Srughna and Pátaliputra [—Palibothra, or Patna—] are two several places far apart.†

d. But then, [these heretics may reply] "The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted because there *is* a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to *us*, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship." Therefore he declares as follows :‡

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ २९ ॥

On the heretical view the free soul would be equally liable to bondage.

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [—the bond and the free].

न बाह्यविषयेण सहोपरज्योपरञ्जकभावो ऽपि सम्भवति। कुतः। स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव देशाव्यवधानादित्यर्थः। संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनाख्य उपरागो दृष्टः। यथा मञ्जिष्ठावस्त्रयोर्यथा वा पुष्पपुटकयोरिति॥

* अपिशब्देन स्वमते संयोगाभावादिस्समुच्चीयते॥

† स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रौ विप्रकृष्टदेशविशेषौ॥

‡ ननु भवतामिन्द्रियाणामिवास्माकमात्मनो विषयदेशगमनाद्विषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो वक्तव्यस्तत्राह॥

a. To complete the sense we must supply as follows :—'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free, because bondage would [in that case] befal the liberated soul also [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other—], such is the meaning.*

b. Here he ponders a doubt.†

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ॥ ३० ॥

The heretic's attempted defence.

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases—see §29—*does* exist] in virtue of the *unseen* [—i. e. of merit and demerit,—then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say [—the heretic may argue—] "But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the *reception of the influence* may result merely from the force of the *unseen* [—i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,—the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter with impunity the object that would en-

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* एकस्मिन्विषयदेशे लब्धादुपरागाद्बन्धो न सम्भवतीति शेषः। कुतः। यस्मात् द्वयोर्बद्धमुक्तात्मनोर्न व्यवस्था मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः॥

† अत्र शङ्कते॥

chain one differently circumstanced,]"—if* [*this* be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes, as follows:†

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्य्योपकारकभावः ॥ ३१ ॥

Each back must bear its own burden.

Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [—believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that *objects*—see §26. *b.*—momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of *souls* also is of a like description—], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§27] taking effect on a patient [—say the soul of today—] occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [—say the soul of yesterday—which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual—];—such is the meaning.‡

* नन्वेकदेशसम्बन्धेन विषयसंयोगसाम्ये ऽपि अदृष्टवशाद्वैोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ तव मते कर्तृभोक्त्रोर्भेदात् एककालासम्बन्धाच्च नैवोपकार्य्योपकारकभावः । नहि कर्तृनिष्ठादृष्टेन भोक्तृनिष्ठो विषयोपरागः सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. He ponders a doubt.*

पुत्रकर्म्मवदिति चेत् ॥ ३२ ॥

Whether merit may or may not be imputed.

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [—then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic—admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent—may urge that] as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,—such as that [ceremony—see Colebrooke's Hindú Law, vol. 3. p. 104—celebrated] in anticipation of conception,—which [no doubt] belongs to the *father* [who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods],—in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [—say the soul of to-day—] through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [—say the soul of yesterday—]: such is the meaning† [of the heretic].

b. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.‡

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एक आत्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियेत ॥ ३३ ॥

This will not help the heretic's argument.

Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing,] for, in that case, there is no one per-

* शङ्कते ॥

† ननु यथा पितृनिष्ठेन गर्भाधानादिना पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रस्योपकारो भवति तद्वत् व्यधिकरणेनैवादृष्टेन भोक्तृविषयोपरागः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ दृष्टान्तासिद्ध्या परिहरति ॥

manent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

a. 'In that case'—i. e. on thy theory too the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place,—'for,' i. e. because, on that theory there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to the birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question] so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [—such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young bráhman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted—]; and thus your illustration is not a real one* [on your *own* theory;—it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And according to *my* theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it *is* possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet [of my school] that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity], and there is the injunction† [of Manu— ch. 2. v. 26.—, with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

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* तत्र त्वन्मते गर्भाधानादिकर्मणापि पुत्रस्योपकारो न घटते। हि। यस्मात्। तत्र गर्भाधानमारभ्य जन्मपर्यन्तस्थायी एक आत्मा नास्ति यो जन्मोत्तरकालीनकर्माधिकारार्थं संस्क्रियेतेति। तथाच दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः॥

† अस्मन्मतेऽपि स्थैर्याभ्युपगमाद्वचनाच्च पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रनिष्ठादृष्टोत्पत्तेः पुत्रोपकारसम्भवात् दृष्टान्तस्यासिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥

c. Some other heretic may encounter us on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.] "But then, since *bondage* also [like every thing else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or *nothing at all* for its cause*"—[which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism].

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम्॥ ३४॥

Whether bondage may not be momentary and so require no cause.

Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [—on the heretical view],—the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage'—this must be supplied [to complete the aphorism].†

b. And thus the point relied on is that it [i. e. bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument—viz.—]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is momentary] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.‡

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* ननु बन्धस्यापि क्षणिकत्वादनियतकारणको ऽभावकारणको वा बन्धो ऽस्त्वित्याशयेनापरो नास्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते॥

† बन्धस्येति शेषः॥

‡ तथाचाकारणक एवास्त्वित्याशयः। तथाचायं प्रयोगः। बन्धादिकं क्षणिकं। सत्त्वात्। दीपशिखादिवदिति॥

c. And [—continues the heretic—] this [reason—viz. 'existence'—] does not extend *unduly* [—as you may object—] to the case of a jar or the like, because *that* also [in my opinion] is like the subject in dispute [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression 'Since there is *no such thing* as a permanent result:'—* [§34].

d. He objects to† [this heretical view].

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.

Aph. 35. Nay—[things are *not* momentary in their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by *recognition*.

a. That is to say;—nothing is momentary, because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. *b*.], taken from such facts of recognition as "What I saw,—that same do I touch,"—[an argument which may be stated as follows]—viz.

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is permanent]—as a jar, or the like.‡

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* नच घटादौ व्यभिचारः तस्यापि पक्षसमत्वात्। एतदेवोक्तं स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेरित्यनेन ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ न कस्यापि क्षणिकत्वं यदद्राक्षं तदेवाहं स्पृशामीत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानुगृहीतेन बन्धादिकं स्थिरं सत्त्वात् घटादिवदिति प्रत्यनुमानेन क्षणिकत्वस्य बाधादित्यर्थः ॥

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say,—nothing is momentary, because the general principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this—viz. "All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,"—and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. "How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?"*

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic] because his instance is not a fact.

a. That is to say,—the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instances [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization,—§34. *b*.]:—moreover thou quite errest in regard to momentariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]:—such is the import.†

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* सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभिः कथमसतः सज्जायेतेत्यादिश्रौतादियुक्तिभिश्च कार्यकारणात्मकाखिलप्रपञ्चे क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य विरोधान्न क्षणिकत्वं कस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

† दृष्टान्ते दीपशिखादौ क्षणिकत्वस्यासिद्धेः न क्षणिक-

If things were momentary there could be no relation of cause and effect.

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there *is* no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect], because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect [—and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this he declares as follows :*

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३८ ॥

The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously.

Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask,—does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar as *simultaneously* coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first,—because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's *subsequent* production]. Neither is it the last,—in regard to which he declares as follows :†

त्वानुमानमित्यर्थः। किञ्च सूक्ष्मानेकक्षणानाकलनेन क्षणिकत्वभ्रम एव तत्र तवेति भावः ॥

* किञ्च क्षणिकत्ववादे मृद्घटादिस्थले कार्यकारणभावो नोपपद्यते। नच नास्त्येव स इति वाच्यं कार्यार्थिनः प्रवृत्त्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्सिद्धेरित्यभिप्रेत्याह ॥

‡ किं मृद्घटयोर्युगपज्जायमानयोः कार्यकारणभावः किं

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

Aph. 39. Because when the antecedent departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is further inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things,—because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e. the cause, departs,—the consequent, i. e. the product, is 'unfit,' i. e. is not competent to arise ;—because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from] its substantial cause,* [and is incapable therefore, of surviving it].

b. With reference to this same topic—viz. the substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection† [to the theory of the momentary duration of things].

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ ४० ॥

The co-existence of substance and product is impossible if things be momentary.

Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.

वा क्रमिकयोः। नाद्यः विनिगमकाभावात् घटार्थिनो मृदादिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च। नान्त्य इत्याह ॥

* पूर्वस्य कारणस्यापायकाले उत्तरस्य कार्यस्यायोगादुत्पत्त्यनौचित्यादपि न क्षणिकत्ववादे सम्भवति कार्यकारणभावः। उपादानकारणानुगततयैव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्थः ॥

† उपादानकारणमधिकृत्यैव दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

a. To complete the aphorism we must say,—'moreover, [on the theory objected to] there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives—that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives—that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exist:—and these two [conditions—on *your* theory—] cannot be, because, since things [in your opinion] are momentary in their duration, the two [—viz., the substance and the product—], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times* [—and cannot therefore co-exist,—for the product—according to you—does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then [the heretic may say—do not let the *co-existence* of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two—but] let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the *instrumental* cause, in respect merely of its *antecedence*. To this he replies.†

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* पूर्वस्य भावकाले उत्तरस्यासम्बन्धादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेषः। यदोपादेयं तदोपादानं यदोपादानाभावस्तदोपादेयाभाव इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकौ उपादेयोपादानयोः कार्यकारणभावग्राहकौ तौ च क्षणिकत्वेन क्रमिकयोस्तयोर्विरुद्धकालत्वान्न सम्भवतः॥

† ननु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभावमात्रेणैव कारणतास्त्विति तत्राह॥

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः॥ ४१॥

Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument.

Aph. 41. If there were merely *antecedence*, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

a. And it could not be determined that this was the *substance* [of this or that product] on the granting of nothing more than its *antecedence* [to the product], because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the *instrumental* causes;—for [—as we need scarcely remind you—], that there *is* a distinction between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed:—such is the meaning.*

The question whether any thing exists besides Thoughts.

b. Other heretics say—"Since no thing [really] exists except *Thought*, neither does *Bondage*, just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false*." He rejects the opinion of these† [heretics]:

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः॥ ४२॥

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External as well as the Internal.

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external.

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* पूर्वभावमात्राभ्युपगमे च इदमेवोपादानमिति नियमो न स्यात् निमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावाविशेषात्। ईदृगेव हि निमित्तोपादानयोर्विभागो सर्वलोकसिद्ध इत्यर्थः॥

† अपरे नास्तिका आहुः। विज्ञानातिरिक्तवस्त्वभावेन बन्धो ऽपि स्वप्नपदार्थवत् अतो ऽत्यन्तं मिथ्यात्वेन न तत्र कारणमस्तीति तन्मतमपाकरोति॥

a. That is to say—the *reality* is not *Thought* alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.*

b. But then [these heretics may rejoin]—"From the example of intuitive perception in *dreams* [see Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. I.], we find this [—your supposed evidence of objective reality—] to exist even in the *absence* of objects!" To this he replies :—†

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ ४३ ॥

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [—i. e. nothing exists at all].

a. That is to say ;—if external things do not exist, then a mere *void* offers itself. Why? Because if the external does not exist, then *thought* does not exist. For it is *intuition* that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of *thought* also would not establish [the existence of] thought.‡

b. "Then *let* the reality be a mere void ;—and therefore the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just *because a*

* न विज्ञानमात्रं तत्त्वं बाह्यार्थानामपि विज्ञानवत् प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु स्वप्नप्रतीतिदृष्टान्तेन विषयाभावेऽपि तदुपपत्तिरिति तत्राह ॥

‡ तर्हि बाह्याभावे शून्यं प्रसज्येत। कुतः। बाह्याभावे विज्ञानाभावात्। प्रतीतिर्हि विषयसाधिका बाह्यप्रतीतिश्चेन्न विषयं साधयेद्विज्ञानप्रतीतिरपि न विज्ञानं साधयेदिति भावः ॥

void is all :"—with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition.*

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्य ॥ ४४ ॥

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

Aph. 44. The reality is a void ; what is, perishes,—because to perish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [—says this prince of heretics,—or the fact that nothing exists at all—] is the reality [—or the only truth—]. Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal and not real. Therefore *who* can be bound by *what ?*—this [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is 'because to perish is the habit of things,'—because to perish is the *very nature* of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own *nature* [—so that nothing could continue if it *ceased* to perish],—such is the meaning.†

* अस्तु तर्हि शून्यमेव तत्त्वमतश्च बन्धकारणान्वेषणमयुक्तं तुच्छत्वादिति नास्तिकशिरोमणिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

† शून्यमेव तत्त्वं। यतस्सर्वो ऽपि भावो विनश्यति यच्च विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वप्नवत्। अतस्सर्ववस्तूनामाद्यन्तयोरभावमात्रत्वात् मध्ये क्षणिकसत्त्वं सांवित्तिकं न पारमार्थिकं बन्धादि। ततः किं केन बध्येत इत्याशयः। भावानां

b. He rejects* [this heretical view].

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

The indiscerptible is indestructible.

a. 'Of unintelligent persons'—i. e. of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,'—i. e. a mere *idle* counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable *because it exists*; [and such an assertion is idle] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.†

b. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even *products* perish, for, just as by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that 'the jar has passed away,' it is only settled that the jar, or the like, *is in the condition* of having passed away.‡

विनाशित्वे हेतुर्वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्येति विनाशस्य वस्तुस्वभावत्वात्। स्वभावन्तु विहाय न पदार्थस्तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः॥

* परिहरति॥

† अबुद्धानां मूढानां अपवादमात्रं भावत्वाद्विनाशित्वमिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारणाभावेन निरवयवद्रव्याणां नाशासम्भवात्॥

‡ किं बहुना। कार्याणामपि न विनाशसिद्धिः। घटो जीर्ण इति प्रत्ययेनेव घटोऽतीत इत्यादिप्रत्ययेनापि घटादेरतीताख्याया अवस्थाया एव सिद्धेः॥

c. He states another objection* [to the heretical view].

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६ ॥

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic theory is not a right one] because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

a. This view moreover [§44] is not a good one, because it has the same fortune as—i. e. is open to similar reasons for rejection as the theory that external things are momentary [§26. *b.*], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§41. *b*]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [—as stated at §35—] the fact of *recognition*, &c., [—which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [—as stated at §42—] the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]:—such is the import†.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics]—viz. "*Let the mere void* [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [—which cannot continue when there is absolutely *nothing*]—and also the means thereof [—since there

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* दूषणान्तरमाह॥

† क्षणिकबाह्यपक्षेण विज्ञानमात्रपक्षेण सह समानक्षेमत्वात् तुल्यनिरसनहेतुकत्वादयमपि पक्षो न सम्यक्। क्षणिकपक्षनिरासहेतुः प्रत्यभिज्ञादिः। विज्ञानपक्षनिरासहेतुर्बाह्यप्रतीत्यादिस्तत्रापि समान इति भावः॥

can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],"—this too can hardly be,—so he declares as follows :*

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥

The soul's aim is not annihilation.

Aph. 47. In neither way [—whether as a means or as an end—] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

a. "Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain"—[says the heretic] :—and this cannot be, because the whole world agrees that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide *in it*,—that is to say, because [*they* hold, while] *you* do not hold that there is a *permanent* soul [—see §33—in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable].†

b. Now certain other things also entertained as causes of [the soul's] bondage by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers and] already rejected, are to be set aside.‡

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* यदपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया तत्साधनतयाच शून्यस्यैवास्तु पुरुषार्थत्वमिति तैर्मन्यते तदपि दुर्घटमित्याह ॥

† दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया दुःखनिवृत्तिसाधनतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थत्वं स्यात्। तच्च न घटते। स्वनिष्ठत्वेनैव सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थत्वावगमात्। स्थिरस्य पुरुषस्यानङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ इदानीं पूर्वनिरस्तावशिष्टान्यास्तिकसम्भाव्यान्यप्यन्यानि बन्धकारणानि निरस्यन्ते ॥

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ ४८ ॥

It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage.

Aph 48. Not from any kind of motion —[such as its entrance into a body—does the soul's bondage result.].

a. 'Bondage' [—required to complete the aphorism—] is understood from the topic* [of discussion].

b. The meaning is,—that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of *motion*—in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.†

c. He states a reason for this.‡

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ ४९ ॥

What is all-pervading does not change place.

Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive [—or, in other words, without motion].

a. That is to say,—because this is impossible—i. e. *motion* is impossible—in the case of the soul which is inactive [because] all-pervading [—and therefore incapable of changing its place].§

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* प्रकरणाद्बन्धो लभ्यते ॥

† गतिविशेषात् शरीरप्रवेशादिरूपादपि पुरुषस्य न बन्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

§ निष्क्रियस्य विभोः पुरुषस्य तदसम्भवात् गत्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [—the objector may say]—"Since, in the books of scripture and of law, we hear of its *going* and *coming* into this world and the other world, let soul be [—not all-pervading, as you allege—but] merely limited [in its extent]; and to this effect also is the text 'Of the size of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit', and the like":—but this conjecture he repels*.

मूर्त्तत्वात् घटादिवत्समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५० ॥

Were the soul limited it might be perishable.

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading, because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

a. That is to say,—and if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i. e., circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle † [—that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see §49. *b*] referring to the *motion*‡ [of the soul,—by showing that the motion is not really of the soul but of an accessary].

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* ननु श्रुतिस्मृत्योरिहलोकपरलोकगमनागमनश्रवणात्पुरुषस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वमेवास्तु तथाच श्रुतिरपि अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ऽन्तरात्मेत्यादिरित्याशङ्कामपाकरोति ॥

† यदिच घटादिवत् पुमान्मूर्त्तः परिच्छिन्नः स्वीक्रियते तदा सावयवत्वविनाशित्वादिना घटादिसमानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ गतिश्रुतिमुपपादयति ॥

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ ५१ ॥

Soul moves not, any more than Space.

Aph. 51.—The text regarding the *motion* [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an *attendant*, as in the case of the Ether [or *Space*, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent', the text regarding its *motion* is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul but] to an attendant;—for there is the text—'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed,—[in this case] the *jar* may be removed, but not the space,—and in like manner is the soul which is like the sky [incapable of being moved]';—and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul—49. *b.*—] belongs to *Nature* [—see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I, §4. *l.*—], from such maxims as this that '*Nature* does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful, and it is wilful *Nature* that in the three worlds reaps these';—such is the import.*

b. It has already been denied [§16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works—in the shape either of enjoined or

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* नित्यस्सर्वगतस्थाणुरित्यादिना प्रमाणेनात्मनो ऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वे गतिश्रुतिरौपाधिकगतिपरा व्याख्येया। घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपम इति श्रुतेः। प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकं प्रकृतिश्च तदश्नाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगेत्यादिस्मृत्या गतेः प्रकृतिनिष्ठत्वावगमाच्चेति भावः ॥

of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage moreover does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom.*

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात्॥ ५२ ॥

The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.

Aph. 52. Nor moreover [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto.

a. That is to say—the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned by works. Why? Because this is no property thereof,—i. e. because this [merit or demerit—see §16. *a.*—] is no property of the soul.†

b. But then [some one may say]—"*Let* it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen' i. e., the merit [or demerit] even of another should attach to a different person,";—whereupon he declares as follows.‡

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे॥ ५३ ॥

Else bondage might cling even to the emancipated.

Aph. 53.—If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated].

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* पूर्वं विहितनिषिद्धव्यापाररूपेण कर्मणा बन्धो निराकृतः। इदानीं तज्जन्यादृष्टेनापि न बन्ध इत्याह॥

† कर्मणा अदृष्टेनापि साक्षान्न पुरुषस्य बन्धः। कुतः। अतद्धर्मत्वात् पुरुषधर्मत्वाभावादित्यर्थः॥

‡ नन्वन्यधर्मेणाप्यदृष्टेनान्यस्य बन्धः स्यात्तत्राह॥

a. That is to say,—if the case were otherwise—if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be]—, then there might be an undue extension,—bondage would befal even the emancipated* [—for the same reasons as those stated under §16. *a*].

b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes]—beginning with its essence [—see §6. *b*—] and ending with its [supposed] works [—see §16—], inasmuch as it is contrary to scripture† [that any one of these should be the cause].

निगणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति॥ ५४ ॥

A single text of scripture upsets equally all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage.

Aph. 54.—And this [opinion that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities;—and so much for that point.

a. And if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of] among which its essential character [§6. *b.*] is the first, this would be contradic-

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* अन्यधर्मत्वे। बन्धतत्कारणयोरन्यधर्मत्वे। अतिप्रसक्तिर्मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तिरित्यर्थः॥

† किं बहुना। स्वभावादिकर्मान्तैरन्येन वा केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिर्न घटते श्रुतिविरोधादिति साधारणं बाधकमाह॥

tory to such texts as "Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] 'qualities' [is the soul];"—such is the meaning.*

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.†

c. The case then stands thus,—since all other theories are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms "There would be no fitness in the enjoining" [see §7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.‡

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say],—this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§54. *c.*], whether it be essential or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§5. *b.*], must occasion the bondage even of the *emancipated.* Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it as follows:§

तद्योगो ऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ ५५ ॥

How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated.

Aph. 55.—Moreover the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated],

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* स्वभावाद्यन्यतमेन पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तौ साक्षी चेताः केवलो निर्गुणश्चेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

† इतिशब्दो बन्धहेतुपरीक्षासमाप्तौ ॥

‡ तदेवं न स्वभावतो बन्धस्येत्यादिना प्रदर्शकेनेतरप्रतिषेधतः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग एव साक्षाद्बन्धहेतुरवधारितः ॥

§ ननु तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगो ऽपि स्वाभाविकत्वे काला-

nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof'—i. e. the conjunction of Nature and of the soul;—this conjunction moreover does not take place again 'through non-discrimination'—i. e. through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated [who *do* discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]; such is the meaning:—and thus the the emancipated and the bound are *not* on a level [—under the circumstances stated at §54. *c.*],—such is the import.*

विपर्ययाद्बन्धः ॥ ५६ ॥

The true cause of bondage, in other words non-discrimination.

Aph. 56.—Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it.†

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ॥ ५७ ॥

दिनिमित्तकत्वे वा मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापादक इत्याशंक्य समाधत्ते ॥

* तद्योगः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगो ऽपि अविवेकात् मुक्ते अविवेकाभावात् न पुनस्संयोगो भवतीत्यर्थः। तथाच न मुक्तबद्धसाम्यमित्याशयः ॥

† एवं हेयहेतुं प्रतिपाद्य हानोपायं प्रतिपादयति ॥

Non-discrimation is removeable by discrimination alone.

Aph. 57.—Its removal is to be effected by the regular [and appropriate] means, just like darkness.

a. The regular means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i. e. a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz. the *immediacy* of discrimination,—by *this* alone is 'its removal'—i. e. the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul] to be effected, and not by *works* or the like;—such is the meaning:—just as darkness—the dark—is removed by light alone* [and by no other means].

b. "But then [some one may say]—if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination,] the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body &c.; and this is contrary to scripture, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning." To this he replies.†

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ॥ ५८ ॥

The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination.

Aph. 58.—Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of *Nature* [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of *Nature* from the soul, what non discrimination of *other* things there *is*—such as the non-discrimination of the *understanding* [as something other than the soul],—*this* necessarily ceases on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul] does occur, it is *based* on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz. Nature], since the non-discrimination of an *effect* [—and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature] is itself an effect* [and will of course cease with the cessation of its cause].

b. The state of the case is this;—as, when the soul has been discriminated from *body*, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the *colour* and other properties—the effects of the body [which is the substantial cause of its own properties],—so, by parity of reasoning,—from the departure of the cause—when soul, in its character of *unalterableness* &c., has been discriminated from *Nature*, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the *products* thereof [i. e. of Nature], such as the 'understanding' and the like, which have the character of being *modifications*† [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

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* शुक्तिरजतादिस्थले लोकसिद्धं यन्नियतं कारणं विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्तत एव तदुच्छित्तिरविवेकोच्छित्तिः न कर्मादिभिरित्यर्थः। यथा ध्वान्तमन्धकारः प्रकाशेनैव नश्यति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाविवेक एव चेत्संयोगद्वारा बन्धहेतुस्तयोर्विवेक एव मोक्षहेतुस्तर्हि देहाद्यभिमानसत्त्वे ऽपि मोक्षः स्यात् तच्च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरुद्धमिति तत्राह ॥

* पुरुषे प्रधानाविवेकात्कारणात् यो ऽन्याविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेके जाते कार्याविवेकस्य कार्यतया अनादिकारणाविवेकमूलकत्वात्तस्य प्रधानाविवेकहाने सत्यवश्यं हानमित्यर्थः ॥

† यथा शरीरादात्मनि विविक्ते शरीरकार्येषु रूपादिष्व-

c. But then [some one may say]—"What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a *Nature* [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding' &c. [which you tell us are products of this supposed first principle]?—for all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as 'I am ignorant' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding' &c. [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding' &c.]:"—well, if any one says this, I reply, No,—because, without there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following,—viz.—"Having died, having died, again when there is a creation let me be a denizen of Paradise and not of hell;"—because no *products,* such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew* [—any more than a gold bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else.

d. Moreover it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding' &c., is [the *primary* cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by any thing,—because 'understanding' and the rest [—as you will not deny—] are

विवेको न सम्भवति तथा कूटस्थत्वादिधर्मैः प्रधानात्पुरुषे विविक्ते तत्कार्येषु परिणामादिधर्मकेषु बुद्ध्यादिष्वभिमानो न स्थातुमुत्सहते तुल्यन्यायात्कारणनाशाच्चेति भावः ॥

* ननु बुद्ध्याद्यभिमानातिरिक्ते प्रधानाभिमाने किं प्रमाणमहमज्ञ इत्याद्यखिलाभिमानानां बुद्ध्यादिविषयत्वेनैवोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टौ स्वर्गी स्यां माच

effects. Now while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with] any *effects,* it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the *cause,* and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency;—for we see this in ordinary life, and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [—to explain—] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field,—and from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets or other things formed of that gold. And by the removal of these [i. e. the removal of the logically antecedent conceits that the field or the gold is one's property], there is the removal of those* [i. e. the removal of the conceits that the grain &c., and that the bracelets &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property:—and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].

नारकीत्याद्यभिमानानां प्रधानविषयत्वं विनानुपपत्तेः अतीतानां बुद्ध्याद्यखिलकार्याणां पुनः सृष्ट्यभावात् ॥

* किञ्च बुद्ध्यादिषु पुरुषाणामभिमानो ऽनादिर्वक्तुं न शक्यते बुद्ध्यादीनां कार्यत्वात् । कार्येष्वभिमानव्यवस्थार्थं नियामकाकाङ्क्षायां कारणाभिमान एव नियामकतया सिद्ध्यति लोके दृष्टत्वात्कल्पनायाश्च दृष्टानुसारित्वात् । दृष्टो हि लोके क्षेत्राभिमानात्क्षेत्रजन्यधान्यादिष्वभिमानः सुवर्णाभिमानात्तज्जन्यकटकादिष्वभिमानः तयोर्निवृत्त्याच तयोर्निवृत्तिरिति ॥

e [And if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a *regressus in infinitum,* seeing that, whatever we may assign as the *first* cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to *it,*—or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of its *continuing* so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is reciprocally the cause why it con founds itself,—we reply that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance thereof [i. e. of that error of confounding one's self with Nature], because these two are [alike] without antecedent—like seed and sprout*—[of which it is needless to ask which is the first,—the old puzzle "which was first—the acorn or the oak?"—being a frivolous question].

f. But then [some one may say]—if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time] and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time] and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in §19] that it is "ever essentialy a pure and free intelligence:"—and it is in contradiction to such texts as this—viz.,—"The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it], nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed *liberated* [—seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation which was never *bound*]." This [charge of inconsistency] he repels.†

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* प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोश्च बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वान्न तदभिमाने नियामकान्तरापेक्षेति ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेद्बन्धमोक्षौ विवेकाविवेकौच स्वीकृतौ तर्हि नित्यशुद्धबद्धमुक्तत्वोक्तिविरोधः। तथा न निरोधो

वाङ्मात्रं नत तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥ ५९ ॥

The bondage of the soul is merely verbal.

Aph. 59.—It is merely verbal, and not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the *mind* [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say,—since bondage &c. all reside only in the *mind* [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal—i. e. it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,,'—because it is merely a *reflection,* like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it]; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is *no* contradiction to what had been said before [—as the objector under §58. *f.* insinuates—], such is the state of the case.*

Whether Testimony or Inference, without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage.

b. But then, if bondage &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, then let it be set aside by *hearing* [that it is merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that it is so]:—why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative know-

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नचोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो नच साधकः। न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थतेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति तां परिहरति ॥

* बन्धादीनां सर्वेषां चित्त एवावस्थानात्तत्सर्वम्पुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं शब्दमात्रं स्फटिकलौहित्यवत्प्रतिबिम्बमात्रत्वात् नतु तत्त्वं अनारोपितं जवालौहित्यवदित्यर्थः। अतो नोक्तविरोध इति भावः ॥

ledge [of Soul as distinguished from Not-soul] going the length of *immediate cognition?*—To this he replies.*

युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥ ६० ॥

The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony or of Inference.

Aph. 60.—Moreover it is not to be removed by argument, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in—along with 'argument'—] 'testimony'† [—or verbal authority—which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive *perception* of the real state of the case].

b. That is to say—the bondage, &c., [of the soul], is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without *perceiving;*—just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony or inference without immediate cognition, i. e. without his directly perceiving‡ [how the points of the compass really lie,—to

* ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्पुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं तर्हि श्रवणेन युक्त्या वा तस्य बाधो भवतु। किमर्थं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मोक्षहेतुतया। तत्राह ॥

† यक्तिर्मननं। अपिशब्दः श्रवणसमच्चयार्थः ॥]

‡ वाङ्मात्रमपि पुरुषस्य बन्धादिकं श्रवणमननमात्रेण न बाध्यते अपरोक्षादृते साक्षात्कारं विना यथा दिङ्मूढ-

which immediate perception 'testimony' or 'inference' may conduce, but the necessity of which these *media* or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede].

c. Or it [—*Aph.* 60—] may be explained as follows:—viz.—But then [seeing that] it is declared by the assertion [in *Aph.* 57] viz. that "Its removal must be through the appropriate means," that knowledge in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature] is the remover of *non*-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question],—tell us—is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing [of Testimony], &c., or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§60] "Moreover it is not to be removed by argument," &c. That is to say,—non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument or by testimony, without there be discrimination as an immediate perception,—just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to his direction;—because the only thing to remove an *immediate* error is an immediate individual perception* [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice

जनस्य वाङ्मात्रमपि दिग्वैपरीत्यं श्रवणयुक्तिभ्यां न बाध्यते साक्षात्कारं विनेत्यर्थः ॥

* अथवेत्थं व्याख्येयं। ननु नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिरित्यनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकोच्छेदकमुक्तं तत् ज्ञानं किं श्रवणादिसाधारणमुतास्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह युक्तितोऽपीत्यादि सूत्रम्। अविवेको युक्तितः श्रवणतश्च न बाध्यते नोच्छिद्यते विवेकापरोक्षं विना दिङ्मोहवदित्यर्थः। साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविशेषदर्शनस्यैव विरोधित्वादिति ॥

perceives *white* objects as if they were *yellow*. He may *infer* that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the *testimony* of a friend that it *is* white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous *perception* of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness].

d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of soul from Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination,'* [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore—that 'instrument of right knowledge' *(pramáṇa)* which establishes the existence of these [two *imperceptible* realities] is [first] to be set forth.†

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ॥ ६१ ॥

The evidence for things imperceptible.

Aph. 61.—The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference, as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c.

a. That is to say—'Of things imperceptible,'—i. e. of things not cognizable by the senses,—e. g. Nature and the Soul,—'the knowledge'—i. e. the fruit lodged in the soul,—is brought about by means of that instrument of knowledge [which may be call-

* तदेवं विवेकसाक्षात्कारान्मोक्षं प्रतिपाद्यातः परं विवेकः प्रतिपादनीयः ॥

† तत्रादौ प्रकृतिपुरुषसिद्धौ हि तद्विवेकान्मोक्षः स्यादतस्तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते ॥

ed] 'Inference' *(anumána)* [—but which—see Nyáya Aphorisms —§5—is more correctly 'the recognition of a Sign'], as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality where we cannot directly perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign' occasioned by smoke, &c.*

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation;—but since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge] in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism] as the *chief* thing,—but Revelation is not disregarded† [in the Sánkhya system—see §89—].

c. He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these severally], which subserves the argument that will be [afterwards] stated ‡

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियं

* अचाक्षुषाणां अप्रत्यक्षाणां प्रकृतिपुरुषादीनां अनुमानेन प्रमाणेन बोधः पुरुषनिष्ठं फलं सिद्धं भवति यथा धूमादिभिर्जनितेनानुमानेन वह्नेः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† अनुमानासिद्धमपि आगमात्सिद्ध्यतीत्यपि बोध्यं अस्य शास्त्रस्य अनुमानप्राधान्यात्तु केवलानुमानस्य मुख्यतयैवोपन्यासः नत्वागमस्यानपेक्षेति ॥

‡ प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रमं वक्ष्यमाणानुमानोपयोगिकार्यकारणभावञ्च दर्शयति ॥

तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशति-
गणः ॥ ६२ ॥

The twenty-five realities enumerated.

Aph. 62.—Nature *(prakriti)* is the state of equipoise of Goodness *(sattwa)* Passion *(rajas)* and Darkness *(tamas)*; from Nature [proceeds] Mind *(mahat)*, from Mind Self-consciousness *(ahankára)*, from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements *(tanmátra)*, and both sets [external and internal] of Organs *(indriya)*, and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements *(sthúla-bhúta)*. [Then there is] Soul *(purusha)*:—such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness' &c., i. e. their being neither less nor more [—one than another—], that is to say the state of *not* being [developed into] an *effect*:—and thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise];—such is the complete meaning.*

b. These things, viz. 'Goodness' &c., [though spoken of as the three *Qualities*], are not 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* in the *Vaiśeshika* sense of the word, because [the 'Qualities' of the *Vaiśeshika* system have themselves *no* qualities,—see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.—while] *these* have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, the word 'Quality' *(guṇa)* is employed [as the name of the three things in question] because they are subservient to Soul [and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the *cords* [—which the word *guṇa* also signifies—], viz. 'Understanding' &c., which consist of the three [so called] 'Qualities,' and which *bind* the brute-beast [—so to speak—] the Soul.*

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' *(mahat)*, viz. the principle of 'Understanding' *(buddhi)*, is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs'. The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements'. But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five,—the aggregate of things:—that is to say, besides these there is nothing.†

d. He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the in-

* सत्त्वादिद्रव्याणां या साम्यावस्था अन्यूनानतिरिक्तावस्था अकार्यावस्थेत्यर्थः। एवञ्च कार्यभिन्नं गुणत्रयं प्रकृतिरिति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ॥

* सत्त्वादीनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणाः संयोगविभागवत्त्वाल्लघुत्वचलत्वगुरुत्वादिधर्मकत्वाच्च तेष्वत्र शास्त्रश्रुत्यादौ च गुणशब्दः पुरुषोपकरणत्वात्पुरुषपशुबन्धकत्रिगुणात्मकमहदादिरज्जुनिर्मातृत्वाच्च प्रयुज्यते ॥

† तस्याः कार्यं महत्तत्त्वं बुद्धितत्त्वं। अहङ्कारोऽभिमानः। तस्य कार्यद्वयं तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियञ्च। तन्मात्राणि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः। उभयमिन्द्रियं बाह्याभ्यन्तरभेदेनैकादशविधं। तन्मात्राणां कार्याणि पञ्च स्थूलभूतानि। पुरुषस्तु कार्यकारणविलक्षण इति। इत्येवं पञ्चविंशतिगणः पदार्थव्यूहः एतदतिरिक्तः पदार्थो नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

ferring* [the existence of these principles—the one from the other];

स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ॥ ६३ ॥

The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross'.

Aph. 63—[The knowledge of the existence] of the 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference] from the 'Gross Elements.'

a. 'The knowledge—by inference'—so much is supplied,† [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 61].

b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist by Perception; and thereby [—i. e. from that Perception,—for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama's 5th Aphorism—] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred—[the *στοιχεῖα στοιχείων* of Empedocles];—and so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of the atomic], consist of things [—Subtile Elements, or Atoms,—] which have distinct qualities, [—the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others]:

(2). Because they are gross:—

(3). [Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.,‡ [—the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others].

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* अनुमानक्रममाह सूत्रैः ॥

† अनुमानेन बोध इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ स्थूलं पृथिव्यादि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं। तेन तन्मात्राणामनुमानं। तथाच अप्रकर्षकाष्ठापन्नानि स्थूलभूतानि सविशेषगुणवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि स्थूलत्वात् घटपटादिवदिति प्रयोगः ॥

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

And thence that of self-consciousness.

Aph. 64—[The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these ['Subtile Elements'—§63].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:—

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:—

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:—

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of Self-consciousness—] is not thus [—i. e. is not a *product* of Self-consciousness]—as the Soul [—which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].†

c. But then if it be thus [i. e. if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Intellect'],

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* बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यामिन्द्रियाभ्यां तैस्तन्मात्रैश्चाहङ्कारस्यानुमानेन बोधः ॥

† तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाण्यभिमानवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि अभिमानकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुष इति प्रयोगः ॥

then [some one may object, that,] since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear on the beatification of the potter whose 'Intellect' then surceases; and this [—the objector may go on to say—] is not the case, because *another* man [*after* the beatification of the potter] recognizes that 'This is that same jar* [which you may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say] it is *not* thus,—because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [—'intellect', or 'inner man'—] which could be causes [as the *jar* no longer can be] of the emancipated soul's *experiencing* [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of his intellect in general, nor [an end] of that intellect in its essence:†—[so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter *surceases* on his beatification:—but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]:—

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* नन्वेवं कुलालाहङ्कारस्यापि घटोपादानत्वापत्त्या कुलालमुक्तौ तदन्तःकरणनाशे तन्निर्मितघटनाशः स्यात्। नचैतत् युक्तं पुरुषान्तरेण स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादिति॥

† मैवं मुक्तपुरुषभोगहेतुपरिणामस्यैव तदन्तःकरणे मोचोत्तरमुच्छेदात् नतु परिणामसामान्यस्यान्तःकरणस्वरूपस्य वोच्छेदः॥

e. Or [—as Berkeley suggests in his Principles of Human knowledge, ch. vi.] let the Self-consciousness of the *Deity* be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter &c.* [—who may lose their Self-consciousness,—whereas the Deity—the sum of all life—*Hiranya-garbha*—see *Vedánta-śara* §62—never loses *His* Self-consciousness while aught living continues].

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ ६५ ॥

And thence that of Intellect.

Aph. 65.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness—§64].

a. That is to say,—by inference from [the existence of] 'that'—viz. Self-consciousness—which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' *(buddhi)*—the *great* 'inner organ' *(antah-karana)* and hence called 'the great one' *(mahat)*,—[the existence of which is recognised] under the character of the *cause* of this† [product—viz. Self-consciousness].

b. And so the application [—again rather circular—of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the mood of [mental] assurance:—

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of [mental] assurance:—

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*-अथवा घटादिष्वपि हिरण्यगर्भाहङ्कार एव कारणमस्तु न कुलालाद्यहङ्कारः॥

† तेनाहङ्कारेण कार्येण तत्कारणतया मुख्यस्यान्तःकरणस्य महदाख्यस्य बुद्धेरनुमानेन बोध इत्यर्थः॥

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of mental assurance—], is not thus [—i. e. is not a product of mental assurance—] as the Soul [which is not made out of anything antecedent], &c *

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood. Every one, having first determined any thing under a concept [i. e. under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term,—for example, that this, which presents itself, is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other—], after that makes the judgment "This is I,"—or "This ought to be done by me,"—and so forth:—so much is quite settled [—and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having in the present instance, to look for some *cause* of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [—the occasional conception and the subsequent occasional judgment which is a function of Self-consciousness—], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong,—[and this is sufficient] because it follows as a matter of course that the occurrence of a *function* of the effect must result from the occurrence of a *function* of the cause† [—nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any product except so far and in suchwise as it pre-existed in the cause of that product].

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* तथाचायं प्रयोगः अहङ्कारद्रव्यं निश्चयवृत्तिमद्द्रव्योपादानकं निश्चयकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुषादिरिति ॥

† अत्रायं तर्को बोध्यः। सर्वो ऽपि लोकः पदार्थमादौ स्वरूपतो निश्चित्य पश्चादभिमन्यते अयमहं मयेदं कर्त्तव्यमि-

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ ६६ ॥

And thence that of Nature.

Aph. 66.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference] from that ['Intellect'—§65].

a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that'—viz. the principle [of Intellect] termed 'the Great one'—which is a *product*, —there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as its cause.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections,—of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(2) Because, whilst it is a *product* [and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(3) [Every *product* that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these,] as lovely women, &c.†

त्यादिरूपेणेति तावत्सिद्धमेव। तत्राहङ्कारद्रव्यकारणाकाङ्क्षायां वृत्त्योः कार्यकारणभावेन तदाश्रययोरेव कार्यकारणभावो लाघवात्कल्प्यते कारणस्य वृत्तिलाभेन कार्यवृत्तिलाभस्यौत्सर्गिकत्वादिति ॥

* ततो महत्तत्त्वात् कार्यात् कारणतया प्रकृतेरनुमानेन बोधः ॥

† अयं प्रयोगः। सुखदुःखमोहधर्मिणी बुद्धिः सुखदुःख-

c. For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore [is known to be mainly made up of or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten], occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'*

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection] in this case is [the principle] that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.†

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have the evidence of inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned,‡ [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products].

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ॥ ६७ ॥

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 67.—[The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that

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मोहधर्मकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वात् कान्तादिवदिति ॥

* कान्ता हि भर्त्तुः सुखदेति सात्त्विकी । अविनया दुःखदेति राजसी । विरहान्मोहदेति तामसी भवति ॥

† कारणानुसारेणैव कार्यगुणौचित्यञ्चात्रानुकूलस्तर्कः ॥

‡ अथ यथोक्तकार्यकारणभावशून्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्तरेणानुमानमाह ॥

the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

a. 'Combination'—i. e. conjunction which is the cause [of all products,—these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]:—since whatever has this quality—as Nature, Mind, and so on, [unlike Soul which is *not* made up of parts]—is for the sake of some other,—for this reason it is understood that Soul exists:—such is the remainder* [—required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument in this particular case is as follows]:—

(1) The thing in question—viz. Nature, the 'Great one,' and the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent],—has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself;—

(2) Because it is a combination [or *compages*];—

(3) [Every combination,] as a couch or a seat, or the like, [is for another's, use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service].†

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the *eternity* of Nature *(prakriti)*.‡

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* संहतः कारणीभूतसंयोगस्तद्वतो ऽव्यक्तमहदादेः परार्थत्वाद्धेतोः पुरुषस्य बोध इति शेषः ॥

† प्रयोगस्तु विवादास्पदं प्रकृतिमहदादिकं स्वेतरस्य भोगापवर्गफलकं संहतत्वाच्छय्यासनादिवदिति ॥

‡ इदानीं सर्वकारणत्वोपपत्तये प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वमुपपादयति ॥

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्॥ ६८॥

Argument for the eternity of Nature.

Aph. 68.—Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is root-less.

a. Since 'the root' *(múla)*,—i. e. the cause of the twenty-three principles [—which, with Soul and the root itself make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,]—'has no root'—i. e. has no cause;—the 'root'—viz. Nature *(pradhána)*—is 'rootless'—i. e. devoid of root:—that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a *regressus in infinitum** [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end].

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, as follows.†

पारम्पर्य्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम्॥ ६९॥

The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debar the regressus in infinitum.

Aph. 69—Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some *one* point, and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the *root* of things under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of *regressus in infinitum* if there were a succession of causes—another cause of Nature, and

* मूले त्रयोविंशति तत्त्वानां कारणे मूलाभावात्कारणाभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यं अनवस्थापत्त्या प्रधानस्य न कारणान्तरमस्तीत्यर्थः॥

† अत्र युक्तिमाह॥

another cause of that one again,—there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing;—therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency *(pra-kriti)*,—for this word *prakriti* [usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term *Nature*,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the *root*.*

b. But then [some Vedántí may object,—according to this view of matters]—the position, that there are just twenty-five realities, is not made out; for, in addition to the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature] which [according to you] is the cause of Mind, *another* unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see *Vedánta-sára*—§21—] presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares as follows:†

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः॥ ७०॥

He meets a Vedantic objection.

Aph. 70.—Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us] in respect of Nature.

a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature]—the cause which is the root [of all products]—the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This may be thus stated:—As there is mention in

* प्रकृतेरन्यत्कारणं तस्याप्यन्यदिति कारणपारम्पर्य्येऽप्यनवस्थादोषादन्ततोऽकारणे एकत्र एकस्मिन्यत्रकुत्रचिन्नित्ये परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भविष्यतीत्यतो यत्र पर्यवसानं सैव प्रकृतिरिति हि मूलकारणस्य संज्ञामात्रमित्यर्थः॥

† ननु पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वानीति नोपपद्यते। महत्तत्त्वकारणाव्यक्तापेक्षया ऽविद्याख्यजडतत्त्वान्तरापत्तेरित्याशंक्याह॥

scripture of the *production* of Nature, so too is there of that of *Ignorance* in such texts as this—viz.—" This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit." Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted in respect of *one* of these [—and not the *literal* production of both, else we should have no root at all—], and of the two, it is with *Nature* only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of], the characteristic of which is conjunction, *is* mentioned, for there is mention of such a figurative origination of Soul and Nature in a passage of the *Kaurma Purána* beginning "Of action [or the Primal Agency] and knowledge [or Soul]," and so on. And as there is no mention in scripture of the origin of *Ignorance* as figurative, *it* is *not* from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared in an aphorism of the *Yoga* to be [not a separate entity but] an affection of the mind. Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities* [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle to be styled 'Ignorance'].

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* प्रकृतेर्मूलकारणविचारे द्वयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरावयोः समानः पक्षः एतदुक्तम्भवति यथा प्रकृतेरुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवमविद्याया अपि अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मन इत्यादिवाक्ये अत एकस्या अवश्यं गौण्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या तत्रच प्रकृतेरेव पुरुषसंयोगादिभिरभिव्यक्तिरूपा गौण्युत्पत्तिर्युक्ता। संयोगलक्षणोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्म्मज्ञानयोरिति कौर्मवाक्ये प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्गौण्युत्पत्तिस्मरणात्। अविद्यायाश्च क्वापि गौण्युत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्तस्या अनादिता। अविद्याच मिथ्याज्ञानरूपा बुद्धिधर्म इति योगे सूत्रितमतो न तत्त्वाधिक्यम्॥

b. Or [according to another and more probable interpretation of the aphorism] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i. e. of both Soul and Nature.*

c. But then, there being [as has been shown] a mode of arriving by inference at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflection, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of *all* men? In regard to this point he states as follows:—†

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ७१ ॥

It is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

Aph. 71.—There is no rule [or necessity that *all* should arrive at the truth—] because those who are privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions.

a. For those privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these—by the dull, the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside] by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the *Bauddhas*, &c. By the mediocre, they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the

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* अथवा द्वयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः समान एव न्याय इत्यर्थः॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाद्यनुमानप्रकारसत्त्वे सर्वेषां विवेकमननं कुतो न जायते तत्राह॥

reverse [of what these persons employ them to prove], or by arguments which are not true; [—see the section on Fallacies in the *Tarka-sangraha*]. But it is only the *best* of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature];—such is the import. But there is no rule that *all* must needs reflect in the manner so set forth;—such is the literal meaning.*

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'† [—the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements:'—see §62].

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः ॥ ७२ ॥

By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

Aph. 72.—That first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind.

a. 'Mind' *(manas)*. Mind is so called because its function is 'thinking' *(manana)*. By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' *(niśchaya)*:—that of which this is the function is 'intellect'

* मनने हि मन्दमध्यमोत्तमभेदेन त्रिविधा अधिकारिणस्तत्र मन्दैर्बाद्धाद्युक्तकुतर्कैरनुमानानि बाध्यन्ते। मध्यमैर्विरुद्धासल्लिङ्गैः सत्प्रतिपक्षितानि क्रियन्ते। उत्तमाधिकारिणामेव तूक्तरीत्या मननमिति भावः। सर्वेषामेव तूक्तरीत्या मनननियमो नेत्यक्षरार्थः॥

† महदहङ्कारयोः स्वरूपमाह सूत्राभ्याम्॥

(buddhi);—and *that* is the first product—that called 'the Great one' *(mahat)*:—such is the meaning.*

चरमो ऽहङ्कारः ॥ ७३ ॥

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

Aph. 73.—'Self-consciousness,' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that "*I* exist"—"*I* do this that and the other thing"- -], is that which is subsequent;—that is to say 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one'† [§72].

b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the *Ego* in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature—the formless Objective]—it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence] are effects of this [Self-consciousness];—and so he declares as follows:‡—

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ७४ ॥

* मन इति। मननवृत्तिकं मनः। मननमत्र निश्चयस्तद्वृत्तिका बुद्धिस्तन्महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यमित्यर्थः॥

† अहङ्कारो ऽभिमानवृत्तिकः पदार्थश्चरमो महतो ऽनन्तरो ऽहङ्कार इत्यर्थः।

‡ यतो ऽभिमानवृत्तिको ऽहङ्कारो ऽतस्तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषामुपपन्नमित्याह॥

All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

Aph. 74.—To the others it belongs to be the products thereof [—i. e. of Self-consciousness].

a. 'To be products thereof,' i. e. to be products of Self-consciousness;—that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others, the eleven 'Organs' *(indriya)*, the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements also —the products of the Subtile elements.*

b. But then, if it be thus, [some one may say],—you relinquish your dogma that *Nature* is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares as follows:†

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्य्येऽप्यणुवत्॥ ७५॥

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is mediately the cause of all other products.

Aph. 75.—Moreover, mediately, through that [i. e. the 'great one' §72—], the first [cause—viz. Nature—] is the cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms [—the causes—though not the immediate causes—of jars &c].

a. 'Moreover, mediately'—i. e. moreover not in the character of the immediate cause;—'the first'—i. e. Nature—*is* the cause, of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately] through 'the

* तत्कार्य्यत्वमहङ्कारकार्य्यत्वमन्येषामेकादशेन्द्रियाणां पञ्चतन्मात्राणां पारम्पर्य्येण तन्मात्रकार्य्याणामपि भूतानां तत्कार्य्यत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† ननु यद्येवं तर्हि प्रधानं सर्व्वजगत्कारणमिति सिद्धान्तहानिरत आह॥

Great one,' and the rest;—as, in the theory of the Vaiśeshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on;—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this he declares as follows:†—

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हाने ऽन्यतरयोगः॥ ७६॥

Why Nature is the sole cause.

Aph. 76.—While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a cause], it is applicable to the other of the two [—viz. Nature].

a. That is to say—'while both'—viz. Soul and Nature—are pre-existent to every product,—still, 'since the one'—viz. Soul—from the fact of its never being modified [into anything else—as clay is modified into a jar—] must be 'devoid of,' or lack, the nature of a cause,—'it is applicable'—i. e. the nature of a cause must belong to the *other* of the two.‡

* पारम्पर्य्ये ऽपि साक्षाद्हेतुत्वे ऽपि आद्यायाः प्रकृतेर्हेतुता अहङ्कारादिषु महदादिद्वारास्ति यथा वैशेषिकमते ऽणूनां घटादिहेतुता द्व्यणुकादिद्वारैवेत्यर्थः॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्द्वयोरपि नित्यत्वात्सृष्ट्यादौ कस्य कारणत्वमित्यत आह॥

‡ द्वयोरेव पुम्प्रकृत्योरखिलकार्य्यपूर्वभावित्वे ऽप्येकतरस्य पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वेन हाने कारणताहान्यामन्यतरस्य योगः कारणतासम्भव इत्यर्थः॥

b. But then [some one may say]—let *Atoms* alone be causes, since there is no dispute [that *these* are causal]. In reply to this he says:—*

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ७७ ॥

Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

Aph. 77.—What is limited cannot be the substance of all things.

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all things, as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar;—therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,—such is the meaning.†

b. He alleges scripture in support of this.‡

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ ७८ ॥

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 78.—And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [—i. e. from Nature].

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* नन्वविवादात्परमाणूनामेव कारणत्वमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

† यत्परिच्छिन्नं न तत्सर्वोपादानं यथा न तन्तुर्घटस्य कारणं तस्मात्पदार्थानां पृथक् पृथक् कारणं वक्तव्यमेककारणत्वे च लाघवं तस्मात्प्रधानस्यैव कारणत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र श्रुतिं दर्शयति ॥

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in §77—for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as "From Nature the world arises" &c.*

b. But then [some one may say],—a jar, which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence;—let, then, *antecedent non-existence* be the cause [of each product], since this is an invariable antecedent,—[and hence a cause—"the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause," if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:†—

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ ७९ ॥

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Aph. 79.—A thing is not made out of nothing.

a. That is to say,—it is not possible that out of nothing—i. e. out of a nonentity—a thing should be made—i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the *world* also would be unreal;—such is the meaning.‡

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* युक्तिस्तावत्प्रोक्ता श्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जगत्कारणतामाह प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति ॥

† ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते । नियतपूर्वभावित्वात्प्रागभावः कारणमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

‡ अवस्तुनोऽभावाद्वस्तुसिद्धिः भावोत्पत्तिर्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः । यद्यभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिः तर्हि कारणरूपं कार्ये दृश्यत इति जगतोऽप्यवस्तुत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

b. Let the world too *be* unreal,—what harm is that to *us*? [—if any ask—] he therefore declares as follows :*—

अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ ८० ॥

Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

Aph. 80.—It [the world] is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [—leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition that this is *not* silver. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], no one ever has the cognition 'This world is *not* in the shape of an entity,'—by which [cognition—if any one ever really had such—] its being an entity might be opposed.†

b. And it is inferred that that is false which is the result of a *depraved* cause,—e. g. some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as *yellow,* through such a fault as the jaundice [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses], because all, at all times,

* भवतु जगदप्यवस्तु का नो हानिरित्यत आह ॥

† शुक्तौ रजतमितिज्ञाने नेदं रजतमितिज्ञानाद्रजतबाधः । नचात्र नेदं भावरूपं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावरूपबाधः स्यात ॥

cognize the world as a reality; therefore the world is *not* an unreality.*

c. But then [some one may suggest]—*let* a nonentity be the cause of the world, still the world will not [necessarily therefore] be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows :†

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरान्त्सिद्धिः ॥ ८१ ॥

The product of something is something, and of nothing nothing.

Aph. 81.—If it [—the substantial cause—] be an entity, then this would be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith :—but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product should be real] since *it* is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity]?

a. If an *entity* were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product,—'this would be the case'—i. e. it would be the case that the product is real,—'because of union therewith'—i. e. because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum] :—But since [by parity of reasoning], if a *nonentity* [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity—i. e. by reason of the world's being [on that supposition] necessa-

* दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते यथा कामलादिदोषात् पीतशंखज्ञानं कस्यचित् । अत्रच जगज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वेषां सर्वदा सत्त्वान्न दोषो ऽस्ति तस्मान्नावस्तु जगदिति ॥

† नन्वभावः कारणमस्तु तथाप्यभावत्वं न जगतो भविष्यतीति तत्राह ॥

rily a nonentity [like its supposed cause],—how could this be the case* [that it should be *real*]?

b. But then [some one may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world;—what need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies.†

न कर्मण उपादानायोगात् ॥ ८२ ॥

Action cannot serve as a substratum.

Aph. 82.—Nay,—for *works* are not adapted to be the *substantial* cause [of any product].

a. Granting that 'the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an *instrumental* cause [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the *substantial* cause [of any product], and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted, because Liberation arises [—see §57. *a.* and §84—] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.‡

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* भावे उपादानकारणे। कारणगुणाः कार्ये इति तद्योगेन भावयोगेन तत्सिद्धिः कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वसिद्धिः अभावे जगतो ऽभावत्वे तदभावाज्जगदभावस्यावश्यम्भावात् कुतस्तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥

† नन्वभावस्याभावरूपत्वात् कर्मैव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥

‡ निमित्तं कारणमदृष्टमस्तु धर्माधर्मयोस्तु उपादानकारणत्वं न क्वचिद्दृष्टं। कल्पना हि दृष्टानुसारेणैव भवति। प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शनान्मुक्तिरिति प्रकृतिस्वीकारः ॥

b. But then [some one may say]—since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda; what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] *Nature*? To this he replies.*

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ८३ ॥

Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances.

Aph. 83.—The accomplishment thereof [i. e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through scriptural means:—the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means], because, since this consists of what is accomplished through *means*, [and is therefore not *eternal*], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

a. 'Scriptural means'—such as sacrifices—are so called because they are heard [from the mouth of the instructor in scripture];—not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof'—i. e. the accomplishment of Liberation. 'Because one is liable to repetition of births by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation] was accomplished by *means*,'—i. e. because the [thus far] liberated [soul] is still liable to repetition of births inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation] is not *eternal*, just because it is [the result of] *act*;—for *this* reason the chief end of man does not consist in this† [that is gained through ritual observances].

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* ननु वेदोक्तार्थानुष्ठानादेव मुक्तिसम्भवात् किं प्रकृत्येत्यत आह ॥

† वेदादनुश्रूयत इत्यानुश्रविको यज्ञादिः। तस्मादपि न तत्सिद्धिः मोक्षसिद्धिः। साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगात् कर्मत्वेनानित्यत्वान्मुक्तस्य पुनः संसारावृत्तियोगः तस्मादपुरुषार्थत्वम्॥

b. He now shows what *does* constitute the chief end of man.*

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ८४ ॥

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya.

Aph. 84.—There is scripture for it that he who has attained to discrimination in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births.

a. 'In regard to these'—i. e. in regard to Nature and Soul,—of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there shall be no repetition of births;—the text—viz.—"*He* does not return again," &c.†

b. He states an objection to the opposite view.‡

दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ ८५ ॥

Pain can only lead to pain, not to liberation from it.

Aph. 85.—From pain [occasioned, e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,—and not *liberation* from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by *acts* [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [—on the principle that every effect includes the qualities

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* पुरुषार्थत्वं दर्शयति ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः प्राप्तविवेकस्य विवेकज्ञानादनावृत्तिश्रुतिः न स पुनरावर्त्तत इति श्रुतिः ॥

‡ विपक्षे दोषमाह ॥

of its cause—] would have a variety of pains; and it would be a grief from the fact that it must eventually end:—for to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness but rather [additional] chilliness.*

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the *motive* [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of *things desirable*:—and, in accordance with this, there is the text "By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality," &c. To this he replies.†

काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ ८६ ॥

The character of the end makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

Aph. 86—[Liberation cannot arise from acts] because, whether the end be something desirable or undesirable, this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of *means* [and therefore not eternal but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire [on the part of the virtuous sacri-

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* यदि कर्मसाध्यो मोक्षो भवेत् कर्मणो दुःखबहुलत्वात् मोक्षोऽपि दुःखबहुलः स्यात्। अन्ततः क्षयित्वेनापि दुःखं स्यात्। नहि जाड्यार्त्तस्य जाड्यविमोको जलाभिषेकात् प्रत्युत जाड्यमेवेति ॥

† ननु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमप्रयोजकं किन्तु काम्यकर्मसाध्यत्वं हेतुः। तथाच श्रुतिः कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुरिति तत्राह ॥

ficer], still, though there *is* a difference [as you contend] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by *acts*[—which, I repeat, *permanent* Liberation cannot be—]:—there must still again be pain, for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable because it is a *production*. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to *knowledge* [which, I grant, may be gained by such means], and Liberation comes through knowledge,—so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation *mediately*;* [—but you will recollect that the present enquiry regards the *immediate* cause].

b. [But then some one may say]—supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by *this* means as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality [—*we* whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory,—and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we again look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies.†

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* मा भून्निष्कामकर्मसाध्यं दुःखं तथापि काम्यान्निष्कामकर्मविशेषे ऽपि मोक्षस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमविशिष्टं साध्यत्वात् क्षयित्वेन पुनरपि दुःखं स्यात्। निष्कामकर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वश्रुतिः ज्ञानार्थं। ज्ञानाच्च मोक्ष इति पारम्पर्येण मोक्षसाधनत्वम॥

† यदि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानान्मोक्षो भवेत्तथापि क्षयित्वात्पुनरपि संसार इत्यावयोस्तुल्यत्वमित्यत आह ॥

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रे परं न समानत्वम् ॥ ८७ ॥

The right means effect Liberation once for all.

Aph. 87. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute:—there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated'—who in his very essence is free—there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [—see §56—] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof, there is the destruction—the annihilation—of Non-discrimination;—and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state when the destruction of Non-discrimination is *absolute?* Thus there is no such similarity* [between the two cases as is imagined by the objector under §86. *b*].

b. It has been asserted [in §62] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]:—and since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be *true*] except by *proof*, therefore he displays this† [—i. e. he shows what he *means* by proof].

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकतमं यत्तत् ॥ ८८ ॥

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* निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसः। बन्धो ऽविवेकस्तद्विरोधेनाविवेकध्वंसो नाशः। अविवेकनाशस्य च प्रध्वंसत्वात् कुतः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त्तनमिति न समत्वम्॥

† पञ्चविंशतिगण इत्युक्तं तत्सिद्धिश्च न प्रमाणेन विनेति तद्दर्शयति ॥

What is meant by evidence.

Aph. 88. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' *(pramá)*. That [is what we mean by proof, or evidence—*pramáṇa*—] which is in the highest degree productive thereof [—i. e. of any given 'right notion'].

a. 'Not lodged'—i. e. not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' *(pramátri)*;—in short, not previously got at. The 'discrimination', i. e. the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion':—and whether this be an affection 'of *both*'—i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two [as others hold], *either* way, that 'which is in the highest degree productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof or] evidence *(pramáṇa)*. Such is the definition of evidence in general [—the definition of its several species falling to be consisted hereafter]:—such is the meaning.*

b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination'† [which excludes doubt].

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* असन्निकृष्टः प्रमातर्यनारूढो ऽनधिगत इति यावत्। एवम्भूतस्यार्थस्य वस्तुनः परिच्छित्तिरवधारणं प्रमा। साच द्वयोर्बुद्धिपुरुषयोरेव धर्मो भवतु किंवैकतरमात्रस्य उभयथैव तस्याः प्रमाया यत्साधकतमं तत्प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः॥

† स्मृतिभ्रमसंशयव्युदासाय क्रमेणानधिगत इति वस्तुन इति अवधारणमिति॥

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the *Soul* [—see §88. *a.*—], then the [proof or] evidence is an affection of the *Intellect*. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion'] is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof or evidence—or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object,—such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception—], &c. But if *both* the Soul's cognition, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then *both* of these aforesaid [—the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case—] are [to receive the name of] proof *(pramáṇa)*. You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being *mediately** [the sources of right knowledge].

d. How many [kinds of] proofs are there? To this he replies.†

त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः॥ ८९ ॥

There are three kinds of evidence.

Aph. 89.—Proof is of three kinds:—there is no establishment of more, because if these be established then all [that is true] can be established [—by one or other of these three proofs].

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* अत्र यदि प्रमारूपं फलं पुरुषनिष्ठमुच्यते तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणं। यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठं वृत्तिरूपं तत् तदेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरेव। यदि तु पौरुषेयबोधो बुद्धिवृत्तिश्चोभयमपि प्रमेत्युच्यते तदोक्तमुभयमेव प्रमाणं भवति। चक्षुरादिषु प्रमाणव्यवहारः परम्परयैवेति बोध्यम्॥

† कति प्रमाणानीत्यत आह॥

a. 'Proof is of three kinds;'—that is to say, 'the use of the senses' *(pratyaksha)*, 'the recognition of signs' *(anumána)*, and 'testimony' *(śabda)*, are the [three kinds of] proofs.*

b. But then [some one may incline to say,] let 'comparison' [which is reckoned in the Nyáya a specifically distinct source of knowledge,] and the others [—such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned in like manner in the Mímánsá—], be instruments of right knowledge [as well as these three] in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul:—he therefore says 'because if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof, everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them] there is no establishment of more,'—no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out,—because of the cumbrousness [—that sins against the philosophical maxim that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case—]: such is the meaning†.

c. For the same reason Manu also has laid down only a triad of proofs—where he says [—see the Institutes, ch. xii. v. 105—] "By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, these three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood—viz. Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, &c]". And 'Composition' and 'Tradition' *(aitihya)*, and the like, are include under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' *(anupálabdhi)*, and the

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* त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानी-त्यर्थः ॥

† ननूपमानाद्यपि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकप्रमाणमस्त्वित्यत आह तत्सिद्धाविति त्रिविधप्रमाणसिद्धौ च सर्वस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिर्न प्रमाणाधिक्यं सिध्यति गौरवादित्यर्थः ॥

like, are included under Perception* [—for, the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground, is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground *without* a jar on it].

d. He next states the definitions of the varieties† [of proof,—having already,—§88,—given the general definition].

यत्सम्बद्धं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखिविज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ९० ॥

Perception defined.

Aph. 90.—Perception *(pratyaksha)* is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. 'Being in conjunction'—[literally] 'existing in conjunction;'—'portrays the form thereof'—i. e. assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [—as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured—]; what 'discernment'—or affection of the Intellect—[does *this*], that [affection of the Intellect—see *Yoga* Aphorisms, §5 and §8. *b.*] is the evidence called Perception;—such is the meaning.‡

b. But then, [some one may say] this [definition of Perception

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* अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणत्रयमेवोपन्यस्तं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च शास्त्रञ्च विविधागमं त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सतेति। उपमानैतिह्यादीनाञ्चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेश अनुपलब्ध्यादीनाञ्च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति ॥

† विशेषलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ सम्बद्धं सत् सम्बद्धं भवत्। तदाकारोल्लेखि सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकारधारि भवति। यद्विज्ञानं बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

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—§90—] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do] to the perception, by adepts in the *Yoga*, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone-walls or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception], because there is here no 'form of the thing—in *conjunction*' [with the mind of him who perceives it while absent]:—having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating as follows] the fact that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define.*

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ ९१ ॥

The definition not to be blamed though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 91.—It is not a fault, [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the *Yoga*,] because that of the adepts in the *Yoga* is not an *external* perception.

a. That is to say,—it is only *sense*-perception that is to be here defined, and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the *external* [organs of sense];—therefore there is no fault [in our definition],—i. e. there is no *failure* to include the perceptions of these† [because there is no *intention* to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification‡ [of the definition in question].

* ननु योगिनामतीतानागतव्यवहितवस्तुप्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिः सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकाराभावादित्याशंक्य तस्यालक्ष्यत्वेन समाधत्ते ॥

† ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षमेवात्र लक्ष्यं योगिनस्त्वाबाह्यप्रत्यक्षका अतो न दोषो न तत्प्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ वास्तवं समाधानमाह ॥

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वाऽदोषः ॥ ९२ ॥

But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 92.—Or, there is no fault [in the definition] because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.

a. Or, be it so, that the perception of the *Yogí* also shall be the thing to be defined, still there is no fault [in our definition, §90], —it does not fail to extend [to this also], since the mind of the *Yogí*, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, *does* come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes* [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered "causal" *(lína)* denotes the things, *not* in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in §90. *b*]:—for *we*, who assert that effects *exist* [from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant] is possible.†

Objection that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.'

c. But then [some one may say]—still this [definition] does not extend to the *Lord's* perceptions, because,

* अथवास्तु योगिप्रत्यक्षमपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न दोषो नाव्याप्तिः। यतो लीनवस्तुषु लब्धयोगजधर्मजन्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य सम्बन्धो घटते ॥

† अत्र लीनशब्दः पराभिप्रेतासन्निकृष्टवाची। सत्कार्यवादिनां ह्यतीतादिकमपि स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति तत्सम्बन्धसम्भवेदिति ॥

since these are from everlasting [—past, present, and future, being, as regards Him, indifferent—], they cannot *result* from conjunction. To this he replies:*—

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥ ९३ ॥

That any 'Lord' exists is not proved.

Aph. 93.—[This objection to the definition of Perception has no force] because it is not proved that there *is* a Lord *(íśwara)*.

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception] because there is no proof that there *is* a Lord—is supplied† [from §91].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans [who hold an opinion not recognised by the majority]; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is 'because it is not *proved* that there is a Lord,'—but not the expression 'because there *is no* Lord.'‡

c. But on the implication that there *is* a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception—§90—] is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by conjunction§ [of a sense-organ with its object,—and the percep-

* ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिस्तस्य नित्यत्वेनासन्निकर्षजन्यत्वात्तत्राह ॥

† ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावाददोष इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ अयञ्चेश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढवादेनैव अत एवेश्वरासिद्धेरित्युक्तं न त्वीश्वराभावादिति बोध्यम् ॥

§ ईश्वराभ्युपगमे तु सन्निकर्षजन्यजातीयत्वमेव विवक्षितम् ॥

tions of the 'Lord' may be of the same *kind* with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same *source*].

d. Having pondered the doubt '*How* should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law [which declare his existence]?'—he states a dilemma which excludes this.*

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ९४ ॥

A dilemma to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.'

Aph. 94.—It is not proved that He [the 'Lord'] exists, because, of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The 'Lord' whom you imagine,—tell us—is He free from troubles &c., or is He in bondage through these? Since He is not,—cannot be,—either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:'—such is the meaning.†

b. He explains just this point.‡

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ ९५ ॥

The force of the dilemma.

Aph. 95.—Either way He would be inefficient.

a. Since, if He were free, He would have no desires which instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be

* श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां कथमीशो न सिद्ध्येदित्याशंक्य तर्कविरोधं बाधकमाह ॥

† ईश्वरोऽभिमतः किं क्लेशादिभिर्मुक्तो वा तैर्बद्धो वा अन्यतरस्याप्यभावादसम्भवान्नेश्वरसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ तदेवाह ॥

under delusion;—He must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation &c.* [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the scripture texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies.†

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा ॥ ९६ ॥

The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

Aph. 96.—[The scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord,' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognised [deities of the Hindú pantheon].

a. That is to say:—accordingly as the case may be, *some* text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended—in the shape of a glorification [of Soul] as the 'Lord' [as Soul is held to be,] merely in virtue of junction [with Nature]—to incite [to still deeper contemplation],—to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul—i. e. absolute Soul in general:—and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship preceded by resolution [to create], is intended to extol [—and to purify the mind of the contemplator by enabling him to take a part in extolling—] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahmá, Vishṇu, Śiva, or other *non*-eternal 'Lord,'—since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality] &c., [and in so far liable to perish] have immortality in a secondary sense‡ [—seeing that the Soul in *every* combination is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

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* मुक्तत्वे सृष्टिप्रयोजकरागाद्यभावाद्बद्धत्वे च मूढत्वान्न सृष्ट्यादिक्षमत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां का गतिस्तत्राह ॥

‡ यथायोगं काचित् श्रुतिर्मुक्तात्मनः केवलात्मसामान्यस्य

b. But then [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under §96], what is heard [in scripture—viz.—] the fact that it [viz. Soul] is the *governor* of Nature &c., would not be the case,—for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies.*

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ ९७ ॥

Soul, like the loadstone, acts not by resolve but through proximity.

Aph. 97.—The governorship thereof [i. e. of Soul over Nature] is from its proximity [thereto,—not from its resolving to act thereon—], as is the case with the gem [—the load-stone—in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that its [Soul's] creativeness or its governorship were through a *resolve* [to create or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under §96. *b.*] would apply;—but [it is not so—for] by *us* [Sánkhyas] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its *proximity* [to Nature]—"as is the case with the [load-stone] gem."†

ज्ञेयताविधानाय सन्निधिमात्रैश्वर्येण स्तुतिरूपा प्ररोचनार्था काचिच्च सङ्कल्पपूर्वकस्रष्टृत्वादिप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिः सिद्धस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुहरादेरेवानित्येश्वरस्याभिमानादिमतो ऽपि गौण-नित्यत्वादिमत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्युपासापरेत्यर्थः ॥

* ननु तथापि प्रकृत्याद्यधिष्ठातृत्वं श्रूयमाणं नोपपद्यते लोके सङ्कल्पादिना परिणमनस्यैवाधिष्ठानव्यवहारादिति तत्राह ॥

† यदि सङ्कल्पेन स्रष्टृत्वमधिष्ठातृत्वमुच्यते तदायं दोषः

b. As the gem, the load-stone, acts as an attracter of iron, merely by proximity, without resolving [so to act], so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the 'Great One' [or Mind—see §62—]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as *creator* to-towards that which is superadded to it:—such is the meaning.*

c. And thus it is declared [in some one of the Puráṇas]—"As the iron acts whilst the gem [the loadstone] stands void of volition, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency [seemingly], and non-agency [really]:—it is *not* an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of volition; and it *is* an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature]."†

d. In respect of worldly products also, animal souls overrule merely through their approximation [to Nature]; so he declares as follows.‡

स्यात्। अस्माभिस्तु पुरुषस्य सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं स्रष्टृत्वादिरूपमिष्यते मणिवत्॥

* यथायस्कान्तमणेः सान्निध्यमात्रेण लोहाकर्षकत्वं सङ्कल्पादिना विना तथैवादिपुरुषस्य संयोगमात्रेण प्रकृतेर्महत्तत्त्वरूपेण परिणमनं। इदमेवच स्वोपाधिस्रष्टृत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† तथाचोक्तं। निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्त्तते। सत्तामात्रेण देवेन तथैवायं जगज्जनिः॥ अत आत्मनि कर्त्तृत्वमकर्त्तृत्वञ्च संस्थितम्। निरिच्छत्वादकर्त्तासौ कर्त्ता सन्निधिमात्रत इति॥

‡ लौकिककार्य्येष्वपि जीवानां सन्निधिमात्रेणैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमित्याह॥

विशेषकार्य्येष्वपि जीवानाम्॥ ९८॥

Embodied souls do not energize.

Aph. 98.—In the case of individual products also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity,'—so much is supplied* [from §97].

b. The meaning is this,—that, in the case also of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump—see *Vedánta-śara* §67], animal souls—i. e. souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [—see §100. *a.*]—over-rule merely through proximity, but not through any effort,—seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.†

c. But then [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord', then, through the doubt of a blind tradition [obviated by no intelligently effective guardianship], the *Vedas* would cease to be an authority—[a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies.‡

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* अधिष्ठातृत्वं सन्निधानादेवेत्यनुषज्यते॥

† विशेषकार्य्येषु व्यष्टिसृष्ट्यादिष्वपि जीवानां अन्तःकरणप्रतिबिम्बितचेतनानां सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं नतु केनापि व्यवहारेण कूटस्थचिन्मात्रत्वादित्यर्थः॥

‡ ननु नित्यसर्वज्ञेश्वराभावेऽन्धपरम्पराशङ्कया वेदाप्रामाण्यं स्यादत आह॥

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ ९९ ॥

How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them.

Aph. 99.—The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá for example], since *he* knows the truth—[*is* authoritative evidence].

a. To complete the aphorism we must say—"since *Hiraṇya-garbha* [i. e. *Brahmá*] and others [viz. *Vishṇu* and *Śiva*], are knowers of what is certain—i. e. of what is true—, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where *these* are the speakers, *is* evidence* [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature—§97—], is an overruler in a *secondary* sense [only] of the term, [—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,—] then who is the *primary* [or actual] overruler? In reference to this he says.†

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृ-
त्वम् ॥ १०० ॥

It is in the shape of the internal organ that Nature affects Soul.

Aph. 100.—The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [—i. e. by Soul—] is the over-ruler,—as is the iron [in respect of the magnet].

* हिरण्यगर्भादीनां सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य बोद्धृत्वात्तद्वक्तृको वेदवाक्यार्थोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति शेषः ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेत्सन्निधिमात्रेण गौणमधिष्ठातृत्वं तर्हि मुख्यमधिष्ठातृत्वं कस्येत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

a. The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over-ruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in] Soul;—'just as the iron,'—that is to say—as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet] in consequence of its mere proximity.*

b. He now [—having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception—] states the definition of an induction† *(anumána)*.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १०१ ॥

An Induction defined.

Aph. 101.—The knowledge of the connected, through perception of the connection, is an induction.

a. That is to say,—an induction [or conviction of a general truth] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a mental modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i. e. of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment:—by 'connection' *(pratibandha)* here being meant 'constant attendedness' *(vyápti)*, and through the perception thereof‡ [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

* अन्तःकरणस्य बुद्धेः पुरुषच्छायापत्त्या तेन चैतन्येनोज्ज्वलितत्वाच्चेतनत्वाभिमानादधिष्ठातृत्वं लोहवदिति यथाकर्षको लोहो निष्क्रियो ऽपि सन्निधिमात्रेण कर्षतीति ॥

† अनुमानलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्तिस्तद्दृशः व्याप्तिज्ञानात् प्रतिबद्धस्य व्यापकस्य ज्ञानं वृत्तिरूपमनुमानं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

b. But an inference *(anumiti)* is knowledge in the soul*—[whilst the Induction—so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it—is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding,—see §88. *c.*].

c. He next defines testimony† *(śabda)*.

आप्तोपदेशश्शब्दः ॥ १०२ ॥

Valid Testimony defined.

Aph. 102.—Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence—] is a fit declaration.

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;'—and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration;—such is the meaning:—and [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ,—see §101. *b.*—] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul which is called 'knowledge by hearing'‡ *(śabda-bodha)*.

b. He next volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence.§

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः ॥ १०३ ॥

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.

Aph. 103.—Since the establishment of both [soul and not-soul] is by means

* अनुमितिस्तु पौरुषेयो बोध इति ॥

† शब्दं लक्षयति ॥

‡ आप्तिरत्र योग्यता। तथाच योग्यश्शब्दस्तज्जन्यज्ञानं शब्दाख्यप्रमाणमित्यर्थः। फलञ्च पौरुषेयश्शाब्दबोध इति ॥

§ प्रमाणप्रतिपादनस्य स्वयमेव फलमाह ॥

of evidence,—the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and not-soul are established as being distinct [the one from the other];—therefore has this, viz. evidence, been here declared;—such is the meaning.*

b. Among these [several proofs] he now describes that one by which especially—viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference—Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively.†

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १०४ ॥

The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy.

Aph. 104.—The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy *(sámányato-drishṭa)* is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where—under such circumstances—we repeat—] anything of a *different* kind—i. e. *not* cognizable by the senses—is established:—as when, for example having apprehended a constant accompaniment [—e. g. that an

* उभयोरात्मानात्मनोर्विवेकेन सिद्धिः प्रमाणादेव भवति अतस्तस्य प्रमाणस्योपदेशः कृत इत्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र येनानुमानविशेषेण प्रमाणेन मुख्यतोऽत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषौ विविच्य साधनीयौ तद्दर्शयति ॥

act implies an instrument—] by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of *knowledge*,—viz. [the instrument named] Sense—is established [or inferred to exist] :—such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by *this* [species of inference] that Nature and Soul are proved to exist,—such is the meaning.*

b. Of these [viz. Nature and Soul] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows. The great Principle [—viz. Understanding see §62. *c.*] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion [—to the aggregate of which three in equipoise—see §62—the name of Nature is given—], because, whilst it is [undeniably] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,† [has the characteristic properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold or the like].

c. But [as regards the argument from analogy in proof of the existence] of Soul—[it is, as stated before, under §67, to the following effect] :—Nature is for the sake of *another*, because it is something that acts as a combination,—as a house, for instance,

* यत्र सामान्यतः प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयमादाय व्याप्तिग्रहात्प्रत्यक्षधर्मताबलेन तद्विजातीयोऽप्रत्यक्षार्थस्सिध्यति यथा पृथिवीत्वादिजातीयं कुठारादिकरणमादाय व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं तस्मादुभयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतेस्सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानं । यथा । महत्तत्त्वं सुखदुःखमोहद्रव्योपादानकं कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहधर्मकत्वात्सुवर्णादिजकुण्डलादिवदिति ॥

[which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact, established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organised] bodies, for example,—something of a different kind therefrom [i. e. from Nature]—viz. Soul—is inferred [by analogy as something other than Nature, &c.,—[which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself];—such is the meaning.*

d. But then [some one may say]—since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,] there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:†—

चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १०५ ॥

When it is that experience ceases.

Aph. 105.—Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought—[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By 'Thought' we mean Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [—see *Tarka-sangraha* §92—] surceases [—when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be—], so eternal Nature [—eternal as re-

* पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वाद्गृहादिवदित्यत्र प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं देहाद्यर्थकत्वं गृहादिषु गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयः पुरुषः प्रधानादिपरत्वेनानुमीयत इति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वात्प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वाच्च सर्वदा भोग इत्यनिर्मोक्षः स्यादित्यत आह ॥

gards the absence of any beginning—] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul] :—so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure] does *not* at all times occur :—such is the state of the case.*

b. [But some one may say]—if Nature were the agent, and Soul the experiencer, then it might happen that another should be the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies :†—

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगो ऽन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १०६ ॥

The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

Aph. 106.—The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c.

a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof [—i. e. the fruit of the cook's actions—], so is the case here.‡

b. Having stated a practical maxim [—which may serve in practice to silence, by the *argumentum ad hominem*, him on whose

* चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भोगः। यथानादिरपि प्रागभावो नश्यति तथा नित्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विवेकज्ञानपर्यन्तः प्रसर इति न सर्वदा भोगापत्तिरिति भावः ॥

† यदि कर्तृ प्रधानं भोक्ता पुरुषस्तर्हि अन्यकृतस्य कर्मणो ऽन्यो भोक्तेति स्यादित्याह ॥

‡ यथा सूपकारस्यान्नादिकर्तृत्वमकर्तुरीश्वरस्य फलोपभोक्तृत्वं तथात्रापीति ॥

principles it may be valid—], he now declares his own doctrine* [in regard to the doubt started under §105. *b*].

अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १०७ ॥

Nature is agent but not patient.

Aph. 107.—Or [—to give a better account of the matter than that given in §106—], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the *agent* has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle [—the actual agent—see §99 *b.*] is reflected in it, there arises the *conceit* of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination, &c.,'—that is to say,—because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,—i. e. that the conceit takes place that it is the *agent* that experiences the fruit :† [—whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

b. The opposite of this [wrong view referred to in §107] he states as follows.‡

नोभयञ्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १०८ ॥

Soul is neither agent nor patient.

Aph. 108.—And when the truth is made known, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

* व्यवहारसिद्धान्तमुक्त्वा स्वसिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† न पुरुषः कर्त्ता न वा भोक्ता किन्तु महत्तत्त्वप्रतिबिम्बितत्वात् कर्तृत्वाभिमानः। अविवेकाद्वेति प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकाग्रहात्तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलोपभोगाभिमानसिद्धेरिति ॥

‡ एतद्व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i. e. when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are *perceived* [in their entire distinctness one from the other], 'there is neither'—i. e. neither the condition [as regards soul] of an agent or a patient.*

b. Having discussed [the varieties of] evidence, he now states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence.†

विषयो ऽविषयो ऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्या-
मिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १०९ ॥

What is perceptible under certain circumstances may be imperceptible under others.

Aph. 109.—[A thing may be] an object [perceptible] and also [at another time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of, or [in the absence of opposing causes] an appliance of, the sense.

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. A thing may be not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense,—i. e. through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And this want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.‡

* तत्त्वाख्याने प्रमाणेन प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्साक्षात्कारे नोभयं न कर्तृत्वं न भोक्तृत्वमिति ॥

† प्रमाणमुक्त्वा प्रमेयव्यवस्थामाह ॥

‡ इन्द्रियस्योपादानात् सम्बन्धाद्विषयः । इन्द्रियस्य हानात् सम्बन्धाभावादविषयः । असम्बन्धश्चातिदूरादेरयोग्यत्वात् ॥

What may prevent perception.

b. [To explain the "&c.," and exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that]—it is in consequence of great distance that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived:—[then again] in consequence of extreme proximity the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]:—a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived] in consequence of the obstruction:—from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [—or under his very nose—]:—through its subtilty an Atom [is not perceived]:—nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum:—and so on.*

c. How [—or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated—] comes the imperceptibleness of *Nature?* In regard to this he declares:†—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ११० ॥

The subtilty of Nature.

Aph. 110.—Her imperceptibless arises from her subtilty.

a. 'Her'—i. e. *Nature's*—imperceptibleness is from subtility. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate,

* अतिदूराद्वियति पक्षी नोपलभ्यते । अतिसामीप्याल्लोचनस्थाञ्जनं । व्यवधानात्कुड्यस्थं वस्तु । मनो ऽनवस्थानाच्छोकादिग्रस्तस्य पार्श्वस्थवस्त्वग्रहणं । सौक्ष्म्यादणोः । अभिभवात् मर्दलध्वनिना स्वल्पध्वनेरित्यादि ॥

† प्रकृतेः कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत आह ॥

not [—as a Naiyáyika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term—] the consisting of Atoms,—for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.*

b. How then [it may be asked] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:†—

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ १११ ॥

Nature inferred from the existence of productions.

Aph. 111.—[Nature exists] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [—which are agglomerations—], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;‡ [—see §62. *a.*—and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

b. Some [—the Vedántins—] say that the world has *Brahma* as its cause; others [—the Naiyáyikas—] that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [—the transmitters of the Sánkhya

* तस्याः प्रकृतेरनुपलब्धिः सौक्ष्म्यात्। दुरूहत्वं सौक्ष्म्यं न त्वणुत्वं प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वादिति ॥

† कथं तर्हि प्रकृतिव्यवस्थेत्यत आह ॥

‡ यथा घटादिदर्शनात्परमाणुज्ञानं तथा त्रिगुणकार्यदर्शनात् प्रकृतिज्ञानमिति ॥

doctrine—] that it has *Nature* as its cause:—so he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon.*

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत् ॥ ११२ ॥

A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature by the contradiction of dissentients.

Aph. 112.—If [you throw out the doubt that] it [—viz. the existence of Nature—] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], *it* is not established,'—i. e. Nature [—as asserted by the Sánkhyas—] is not established.†

b. But then [—to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters—], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product,] *then* an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof,—since, you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the invariable accompanier of an effect; but it is denied by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.] that the effect *does* exist [antecedently to its production—well] *if* [this doubt be thrown out];—such is the meaning‡ [of the aphorism].

* ब्रह्मकारणं जगदिति केचित् परमाणुकारणमित्यन्ये प्रधानकारणकमिति वृद्धा इति तत्र संशयमाह ॥

† वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिः प्रधानासिद्धिः ॥

‡ ननु कार्यं चेदुत्पत्तेः प्राक् सिद्धं स्यात् तदा तदाधारतया नित्या प्रकृतिः कार्यसाहित्येनैव कारणानुमानवक्ष्यमाणत्वात् वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्कार्यस्यैवासिद्धिरिति यदीत्यर्थः ॥

c. He states his doctrine on this point.*

तथा त्वेकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ ११३ ॥

Mutual denials settle nothing.

Aph. 113.—But since thus each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you] there is dissent against the other side too,—so how should *it* be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied by it, it is the same with *my* side also;—therefore my inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied† [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well then [—the opponent may say—], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted, how is it that this [cause] is *Nature*—and nothing else [—such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies.‡

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* सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† यदि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण पक्षासिद्धत्वं विपक्षेऽपि विप्रतिपत्तिरस्तीति कथं तत्सिद्धिः। यदि व्याप्यज्ञानाद् व्यापकज्ञानस्याविनाभावित्वात्पक्षसिद्धिस्तर्हि ममाप्येवमिति न कार्यादनुमानापलापः ॥

‡ ननु कार्यात्कारणमस्तु तच्च प्रकृतिरेवेति कथमित्यत आह ॥

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः ॥ ११४ ॥

Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears.

Aph. 114.—Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see §62. *a.*]—viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness:—there would be a contradiction to *these*,—such is the meaning.*

b. The drift here is as follows:—If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world;† [—because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,—and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently] or of what did not exist.‡

नासदुत्पादो नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

What never was will never be.

Aph. 115.—The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

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* त्रिविधो गुणस्सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि तद्विरोध इत्यर्थः ॥

† इदमत्राकूतं यदि परमाण्वादीनां कारणत्वं तदा जगत्युपलभ्यमानस्य सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वस्य विरोधः स्यादिति ॥

‡ इदानीं कार्यस्य सत उत्पत्तिरसतो वेति संशयं निरस्यति ॥

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible;—such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.*

b. He states an argument, why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity.†

उपादाननियमात् ॥ ११६ ॥

A product cannot be of nothing.

Aph. 116.—Because of the rule that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect:—otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,—[the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he states as follows.‡

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ॥ ११७ ॥

Else any thing might occur at any time anywhere.

Aph. 117.—Because every thing is not possible every where, always.

a. That is to say,—because in the world we see that every thing is not possible, i. e. that every thing is *not* produced,

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* नरशृङ्गतुल्यस्यासत उत्पादो ऽपि न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः तथाच सदेव कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्याशयः ॥

† सत्कार्ये न्यायमाह ॥

‡ कारणसम्बन्धात्कार्यसम्बन्धश्च विद्यमानयोरेव । अन्यथा सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वोत्पत्तिस्स्यात् । एतदेवाह ।

'every where,' i. e. in every place,—'always,' i. e. at all times.*

b. And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not† [antecedently].

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ ११८ ॥

Effects pre-exist potentially in their causes.

Aph. 118.—Because that which is possible is made out of that which is competent [to the making of it.]

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it *potentially*, i. e. of] having the power to be the product; and this power is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass;—therefore, since that which has the power, viz., the cause, makes the product which is capable [of being made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He states another argument.§

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* सर्वत्र सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वदा सर्वस्मिन् काले सर्वासम्भवात्सर्वानुत्पत्तेर्लोकदर्शनादित्याशयः ॥

† इतश्च नासदुत्पाद इत्याह ॥

‡ कार्यशक्तिमत्त्वमेव ह्युपादानत्वं शक्तिश्च कार्यस्यानागतावस्थैवेति शक्तस्य कारणस्य शक्यकार्यकरणादपि नासत उत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

§ अपरं न्यायमाह ॥

कारणभावाच्च ॥ ११९ ॥

The product is nothing else than the cause.

Aph. 119—And because it [—the product—] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared in scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; —and since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ १२० ॥

A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.

Aph. 120.—If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that *becoming*, which already *is*—[then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say,—but then, if it be thus [—that every effect exists antecedently to its production—], since the effect [—*every* effect—] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of *becoming*,—the adjunction of *arising*,—in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity,—because the employment of the term '*arising*' [or the fact of being produced] has refer-

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* उत्पत्तेः प्रागपि कार्यस्य कारणाभेदः श्रूयते तस्माच्च सत्कार्यसिद्ध्या नासदुत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

ence solely to what did *not* exist [previously]:—if this be urged:—such is the meaning.*

b. He declares the doctrine in regard to this point.†

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ ॥ १२१ ॥

Production is only manifestation, and so of the opposite.

Aph. 121.—Nay,—the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not].

a. 'Nay'—i. e. the view stated [in §120] is not the right one.‡

b. As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness;—whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,§—[and no longer appears as a *pot*].

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* नन्वेवं सति कार्यस्य नित्यत्वे सति भावरूपे कार्ये भावयोग उत्पत्तियोगो न सम्भवति असत एवोत्पत्तिव्यवहारात् इतिचेदित्यर्थः ॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ न नोक्तपक्षो युक्त इत्यर्थः ॥

§ यथा शुक्लपटस्य मलिनस्य क्षालनादिना शुक्लत्वमभिव्यज्यते तथा कुलालस्य व्यापाराद् घटो ऽभिव्यज्यते मुद्गराभिघातात्तिरोभूयते ॥

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours, for it] is seen;—for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of rice from the rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.*

d. Therefore the employment or non-employment of the [term] the *production* of an effect are dependent on *manifestation* —dependent on the manifestation of the *effect*:—that is to say, —the employment of [the term] production is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced], and the non-employment of [the term] production is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is therefore not spoken of as produced],— but [the employment of the term production is] not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity.†

e. But if [the employment of the term] *production* is occasioned by [the fact of] *manifestation*, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] *destruction*? To this he replies.‡

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* दृष्टाचाभिव्यक्तिः पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य दोहनेन गवि पयसः शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमायाः लैङ्गिकव्यापारेण अवघातेन धान्ये तण्डुलस्येत्यादि ॥

† तस्मात्कार्योत्पत्तेर्व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ कार्याभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तकौ। अभिव्यक्तित उत्पत्तिव्यवहारो ऽभिव्यक्त्यभावाच्चोत्पत्तिव्यवहाराभावो नत्वसतस्सत्त्वेत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनाच्चेदुत्पत्तिः किन्निबन्धनो विनाश इत्यत आह ॥

नाशः कारणलयः ॥ १२२ ॥

What is meant by destruction.

Aph. 122.—Destruction [of any thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [—i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar],—to *this* are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction', and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to any thing* [which is termed its destruction].

b. [But some one may say]—if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλινγενεσις] of it would be seen, and this is *not* seen:—well [—we reply—] it is not seen by blockheads, but it *is* seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [—as when burned to ashes]:—and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.†

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* मुद्गराभिघाताद् घटस्य कारणे यो लयः तन्निबन्धनो नाश इति शब्दार्थक्रियाभेदौ ॥

† यदि लयः पुनरुद्भवो दृश्येत नच दृश्यत इति मूढैर्न दृश्यते विवेचकैर्दृश्यत एव। तथाहि। तन्तौ नष्टे मृद्रूपेण परिणामः। मृदश्च कार्पासवृक्षरूपेण परिणामः। तस्य पुष्पफलतन्तुरूपेण परिणामः। एवं सर्वे भावा इति ॥

c. Pray—[some one may ask]—is this *manifestation* [that you speak of under §121] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never ceases to be] then the effect [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be *perceived*; and if it be *not* real, then there is an end of your 'existent product' [§115 *b.*], because, also of this [manifestation—as being not from eternity—] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another manifestation, and of this another, and so on without end, [—seeing that a *manifestation* can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,—on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]. To this he replies.*

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणाद्बीजाङ्कुरवत्॥ १२३ ॥

How manifestation may occur without being an entity.

Aph. 123.—Because they seek each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [—manifestation may generate manifestation from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there *is* no starting point,—as is the case with seed and plant,† [—which we may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally].

b. He states another argument.‡

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* किमभिव्यक्तिः सती असती वा। सती चेत् नित्यका--र्योपलब्धिः स्यात्। असती चेत् सत्कार्यहानिः तस्या अपि अभिव्यक्तिरन्या तस्या अप्यन्येत्यनवस्थेत्यत आह॥

† भवत्वभिव्यक्तिसहस्रं तथापि न दोषोऽनादित्वात् बीजाङ्कुरवदिति॥

‡ युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

उत्पत्तिवद्वाऽदोषः॥ १२४ :

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 124.—Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [that of] 'production'.

a. Pray [let us ask],—is *production* produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production;—so that there is a *regressus in infinitum*, [such as you allege against our theory under §122. *c*]. If it be *not* produced, then, pray, is this because it is *un-real*, or because it is eternal? If because it is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced] because it is *eternal*, then there should be at all times the production of [all possible] effects,—[which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say,—since 'production' itself *consists* of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]?—then, in like manner, [*I* ask,]—since 'manifestation' itself *consists* of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is *ours* also,*—[and thus every objection stated or hinted under §122. *c.* is capable of being retorted].

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* किमुत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते न वा। उत्पद्यते चेत् अस्या उत्पत्तिरित्यनवस्था। नोत्पद्यते चेत् किमसत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्वा। यद्यसत्त्वात्कदाचिदप्युत्पत्तिर्नास्तीति सर्वदानुपलम्भः स्यात्। अथ नित्यत्वात् सर्वदा कार्योत्पत्तिः स्यात्। अथोत्पत्तेः स्वयमेवोत्पत्तिरूपत्वात्किमुत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तर्ह्यभिव्यक्तेरप्यभिव्यक्तिरूपत्वात्किमभिव्यक्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तुल्यं। तत्र यस्तव सिद्धान्तः सोऽस्माकमपि॥

b. He now states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature mutually.*

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्॥ १२५ ॥

The characters common to all products.

Aph. 125.—[A product of nature is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused'—i. e. having a cause. 'Un-eternal,'—i. e. destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i. e. not present everywhere. 'Mutable'—i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving [one form] and assuming [another form]. It [the soul] leaves the body it had assumed, [and probably takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous'—i. e.—, in consequence of the distinction of souls, [everything is proportionately multitudinous,—each man—e. g.—seeing a separate rainbow, though it be called but one]. 'Dependent'—i. e. [dependent] on its cause. Mergent,—that is to say, it [i. e. each product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated].†

b. [But some one may say],—if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate—see §62—and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely *nothing ?*—[if you say that they are so] then you give up

* प्रकृतिकार्याणामन्योन्यं साधर्म्यमाह॥

† हेतुमत् कारणवत्। अनित्यं विनाशि। अव्याप्यसर्वगम्। सक्रियं त्यागोपादानादिक्रियाविशिष्टम्। उपात्तदेहं त्यजति शरीरादयश्च स्पन्दन्ते। अनेकं पुरुषभेदात। आश्रितं स्वकारणे। लिङ्गं स्वकारणे लयं गच्छतीति॥

what you *see*—[in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilable]. To this he replies.*

आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा॥ १२६ ॥

The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 126—There is the establishment of these, [which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [—as contradistinguished from the *three* Qualities of the Sánkhya—] are truly nothing different; or [—to put it in another point of view—] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [—in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles—'truly'—really—quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—'there is the establishment of these'—i. e. there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those† [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].

b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because

* यदि पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वं किं ज्ञानसुखादीनां सामान्यकर्मणामभाव एव तदा च दृष्टपरित्याग इत्यत आह॥

† आञ्जस्यात् स्वरूपतः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वादभेदतस्तल्लक्षणयोगाद्गुणसामान्यादीनां तत्सिद्धिस्तेष्वेवान्तर्भावात् सिद्धिः॥

they are hinted by [the term] Nature :'— that is to say,—the qualities, &c., [such as Knowledge,] are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that these qualities are, mediately, products of Nature,—for there is no difference between product and cause;—but the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.*

c. He next mentions the points in which Nature and her products agree.†

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥ १२७ ॥

The characters common to Nature and her products.

Aph. 127.—Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§62. *a.*] and that they are irrational —[is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational,—[such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression "&c." is meant their being intended for *another*, [—see §67—]. 'Of both'—i. e. of the cause [viz. Nature], and of the effects [—viz. all natural products—], such is the meaning‡.

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* वाशब्दः पक्षान्तरं सूचयति । प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा । गुणानां पारम्पर्येण प्रधानकार्यत्वेन कार्यकारणयोरभेदात्प्रधानव्यपदेशादेव गुणादिसिद्धिर्नत्वभावादननुकीर्त्तनमिति ॥

† प्रकृतिकार्ययोस्साधर्म्यमाह ॥

‡ त्रिगुणत्वमचेतनत्वं । आदिशब्दात् परार्थत्वं । द्वयोरिति कार्यकारणयोरित्यर्थः ॥

b. He next states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see §62] are the [constituent] parts of Nature.*

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यवैधर्म्यम् ॥ १२८ ॥

In what the three Qualities differ.

Aph. 128.—The Qualities [§62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves].

a. 'Pleasantness,'—i. e. Pleasure. By the '&c,' is meant Goodness (*sattwa*), which is light [i. e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,'—i. e. Pain. By the '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (*rajas*), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,'—i. e. stupefaction. By the '&c.' is meant Darkness (*tamas*), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz:—Goodness, Passion, and Darkness differ ;—such is the remainder† [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree.‡

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* प्रकृतिविभागस्य त्रिगुणस्यान्योन्यवैधर्म्यमाह ॥

† प्रीतिः सुखम् । आदिशब्दाल्लघु प्रकाशकं सत्त्वम् । अप्रीतिर्दुःखम् । आदिशब्दादुपष्टम्भकं चलञ्च रजः । विषादो मोहः । आदिशब्दाद्गुरुवरणकं तमः । एतैर्धर्मैर्गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां वैधर्म्यम्भवतीति शेषः ॥

‡ तेषां वैधर्म्यकथनावसरे साधर्म्यमाह ॥

लघ्वादिधर्म्मैरन्योन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं गुणानाम् ॥ १२९ ॥

In what respects the Qualities agree as well as differ.

Aph. 129.—Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities, mutually, agree and differ.

a. The meaning is as follows. The enunciation [—in the shape of the term *laghu* 'light'—is not one intended to call attention to the concrete—viz. what things are light,—but] is one where the abstract [—the nature of light things—viz. 'lightness'—*laghutwa*] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,'—i. e. through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,—the Qualities differ. Their *agreement* is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over the other from time to time], producing each other, consorting together, and being reciprocally present [—the one in the other—], for the sake of the soul.*

b. By the expression [—in § 125—] 'caused,' &c., it was declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are *products.* He states the proof of this.†

उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् ॥ १३० ॥

Proof that Mind, &c., are products.

Aph. 130.—Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature—the only two un-

* अयमर्थः। भावप्रधानो निर्द्देशः। लघ्वादिधर्म्मैर्लघुचलनगुरुत्वैर्गुणानां वैधर्म्यम्। आदिपदसूचितेन साधर्म्यम्। तच्च पुरुषार्थमन्योन्याभिभवजननमिथुनवृत्तित्वम्॥

† हेतुमदित्यादिना महदादीनां कार्यत्वमुक्तम्। तत्र प्रमाणमाह॥

caused entities—], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like.

a. That is to say,—like a jar or the like, Mind and the rest are products, because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.*

b. He states another reason.†

परिमाणात् ॥ १३१ ॥

A second proof.

Aph. 131.—Because of their measure, [which is a limited one].

a. That is to say, [Mind and the rest are products] because they are limited in measure,‡ [while the only two that are uncaused, viz. Nature and soul, are unlimited].

b. He states another argument.§

समन्वयात् ॥ १३२ ॥

A third proof.

Aph. 132.—Because they conform [to Nature].

a. [Mind and the rest are products] because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature [§62] are seen in all things :|| [and it is a maxim that there is nothing in the effect that was not in the cause].

* नित्याभ्यां प्रकृतिपुरुषाभ्यामन्यत्वात् घटादेरिव महदादेः कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह॥

‡ परिमितत्वादित्यर्थः॥

§ अपरां युक्तिमाह॥

|| प्रधानेन सह सम्यगन्वयात् प्रधानगुणानां सर्वपदार्थेषु दर्शनात्॥

b. He states the same thing* [in the next aphorism].

शक्तितश्चेति ॥ १३३ ॥

A fourth proof.

Aph. 133.—And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause that a product energizes [—as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron—], so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature] powerless, produce *their* products in subservience to Nature;—otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products†—[which it will not be alleged that they do].

b. And the word *iti*, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons‡ [why Mind and the others should be regarded as *products*].

c. He next states [—in support of the same assertion—] the argument from negatives,§ [i. e. the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others when they are *not* products].

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* एतदेवाह ॥

† कारणशक्त्या कार्यं प्रवर्त्तत इति महदादयः क्षीणाः सन्तः प्रकृत्यनुसारेण कार्यं जनयन्ति। अन्यथा प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वात्सर्वदा कार्यं जनयेयुः ॥

‡ इतिशब्दश्चात्र हेतुवर्गसमाप्तिसूचनार्थः ॥

§ व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥ १३४ ॥

Proof of the same from negatives.

Aph. 134.—On the quitting thereof [—quitting the condition of product—], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product or not-product,—such is the pair of alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof,'—i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,—Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature or Soul,*[—these two alone being not-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this he declares as follows.†

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥ १३५ ॥

Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor not-product.

Aph. 135.—If they were other than these two they would be void.

a. If Mind and the rest were other 'than these two,' i. e. than product or not-product [—§134—], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,'—i. e. in the shape of nonentity.‡

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* कार्यमकार्यञ्चेति कोटिद्वयं। तद्धाने महदादेः कार्यताहाने प्रकृतौ पुरुषे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति ॥

† उभयकोटिविनिर्मुक्ता एव महदादयो भविष्यन्तीत्याह ।

‡ तयोः कार्याकार्ययोरन्यत्वे महदादीनां तुच्छरूपत्वमभावरूपत्वम् ॥

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a *product* that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature ? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign merely in virtue of their not *occurring apart* from it. To this he replies.*

कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥ १३६ ॥

What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects.

Aph. 136.—The cause is inferred from the effect [—in the case of Nature and her products—], because it accompanies it.

a. This may indeed be the case where the nature [or essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect, as [is the case with] the inference—from the rising of the moon—that the sea is swoln [into full tide,—rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 'apart from' the rising of the moon, yet here the cause —moon-rise—is not seen in the effect—tide ; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause *is* inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it'— i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature†—[i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar].

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* अथ किमर्थं महदादयः कार्यत्वेन प्रकृतेर्लिङ्गं । अविनाभावादेव लिङ्गम्भविष्यन्तीत्यत्राह ॥

† भवत्वेवं यत्र कारणरूपं कार्ये न दृश्यते यथा चन्द्रोदयात्समुद्रवृद्ध्यनुमानम् । अत्र तु प्रधानरूपस्य महदादौ

b. [But it may still be objected,—] if it be thus, then let that principle itself—the 'Great one' [or Mind]—be the cause of the world :—what need of *Nature ?* To this he replies.*

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात् ॥ १३७ ॥

How Mind must have an antecedent.

Aph. 137.—The undiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its effect, in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It goes to dissolution'—such is the import of the term *linga,* here rendered 'effect.' From that [effect],—viz. the 'Great' principle [or Mind]—in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great' principle, in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is limited [or discrete], and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [—i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable,† [—in other words its 'cause,'—here analogously termed *lingin,* since 'effect' had been termed *linga*].

b. But then, [some one may say,] still something quite differ-

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दर्शनात् कार्यात्कारणानुमानमेव तत्साहित्यात् प्रकृतिरूपस्य महदादौ दर्शनात् ॥

* एवं चेत् महत्तत्त्वमेव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानेनेत्यत आह ॥

† लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गं कार्यम् । तस्मात् त्रिगुणात् महत्तत्त्वात् प्रधानमनुमातव्यम् । महत्तत्त्वञ्चाध्यवसायरूपं व्यक्तं विनाशि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् । तेन लिंग्यनुमानम् ॥

ent may be the cause [of all things];—what need of this *Nature* of yours? In regard to this he remarks as follows.*

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १३८ ॥

Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all.

Aph. 138.—There is no denying that it [—Nature—] *is*, because of its effects, [—which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with *its* cause, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.* If effects be from any *root* [—to which there is nothing antecedent—], then *this* is that [to which we give the name of *Nature*]. 'Because of its effects,'—that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it *is*,' —i. e. that *Nature* is.†

b. Be it so—[let us grant—] that Nature *is*; yet [—the opponent may contend—] *Soul* positively cannot be,—for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has *no* products. In regard to this he remarks as follows.‡

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* ननु तथाप्यन्यदेव कारणम्भविष्यति किं प्रकृत्येत्यत्राह ॥

† तत्कारणं कार्यमकार्यं वा । कार्यत्वे तत्कारणस्यापि तथात्वे सत्यनवस्था । मूलकार्यत्वे तदेव सेति । तत्कार्यत इति प्रकृतिकार्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्सिद्धेः प्रकृतिसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥

‡ भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धिः पुरुषस्य सिद्धिस्तु न स्यादेव । न हि तस्य कार्यमस्तीत्यत्राह ॥

सामान्येन विवादाभावात् धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥ १३९ ॥

It is not from any effect that soul is inferred.

Aph. 139.—[The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though *what* kind of thing *is* matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a thing'—i. e. as to there being Soul simply [—since everybody, who does not talk stark nonsense, must admit a Soul, or *self*, of *some* kind—]; for the dispute is [not as to its *being*, but] as to its peculiarity [of being],—as [whether it be] multitudinous or sole, all-pervading or *not* all-pervading, and so forth. Just as in every [philosophical system or] theory there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' *(dharma)*; for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices according to the Mímánsa creed, or good works according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'*

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [—viz. the existence of soul]:—i. e. the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This implies—"I will mention *another* means of establishing it."†

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* सामान्येन तावदात्मनि विवादो नास्ति विशेषे हि विवादो अनेक एको व्यापको ऽव्यापक इत्यादि । यथा सर्वस्मिन् दर्शने धर्म इत्यविवादः धर्मविशेषे हि विप्रतिपत्तिः ॥

† न तत्साधनं । न तत्र कार्यकारणभावः साधनम् । अन्यत्साधनं वक्ष्यामीत्यभिसन्धिः ॥

b. [But some one may say—] Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c.;—what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies.*

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥ १४० ॥

Materialism scouted. *Aph.* 140.—Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.†

b. He propounds an argument in support of this.‡

संहतपरार्थत्वात् ॥ १४१ ॥

The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible. *Aph.* 141.—Because that which is combined [and is therefore discerptible,] is for the sake of some other [*not* discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.*§

b. And combinedness [—involving—see §67—discerptibleness—] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture;—or [to express it otherwise—] combinedness is the state of the soft and hard—[which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Na-

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* देहेन्द्रियादय एवात्मानः किमन्यकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥

† व्यक्तम् ॥

‡ अत्र न्यायमाह ॥

§ यत्संहतं तदसंहतपरार्थं संहतपरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्था स्यात् ॥

ture and the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof.*

c. He elucidates this same point.†

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥ १४२ ॥

Soul presents no symptom of being material. *Aph.* 142.—[Soul is something else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because, in Soul, there is 'the reverse' of the three Qualities, &c.,—i. e. because they are not seen in it. By the '&c.' is meant—because the *other* characters of Nature also are not seen [in Soul]‡.

b. He states another argument§.

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥ १४३ ॥

Another proof that soul is not material. *Aph.* 143.—And [Soul is not material] because of its superintendence [over Nature].

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* संहतत्वञ्च गुणानामन्योन्यमिथुनभावेन कार्यकरणं अथवा द्रवकठिनता संहतत्वं । तच्च प्रकृत्यादौ तिरोभूतमस्ति अन्यथा तत्कार्येषु संहतताऽदर्शनप्रसङ्गात् ॥

† तदेव स्पष्टयति ॥

‡ पुरुषे त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् तददर्शनात् । आदिशब्दादन्येषां प्रकृतिधर्माणामप्यदर्शनादिति ॥

§ न्यायान्तरमाह ॥

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent,—such is the meaning*.

b. He states another argument†.

भोक्तृभावात् ॥ १४४ ॥

Another proof.

Aph. 144.—And [Soul is not material] because of its being the experiencer.

a. Nature it is that is experienced;—the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism] is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals it‡ [—and thus makes it *seem* as if it experienced:—see §59. *a*].

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the soul or of Nature—[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies.§

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः ॥ १४५ ॥

For Soul, not Nature, is liberation wanted.

Aph. 145.—[It is for Soul and not for Nature,] because the exertions are with a

* चेतनो ह्यधिष्ठाता भवति प्रकृतिश्च जडेत्यर्थः ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ भोग्या प्रकृतिः। भोक्ता पुरुषः। यद्यपि कूटस्थत्वादात्मनो भोक्तृत्वं नास्ति तथापि बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्येत्यर्थः ॥

§ मोक्षार्थं प्रवृत्तिः। सा किमात्मनः प्रकृतेर्वा इत्यत आह ॥

view to isolation [from all qualities,—a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated], for the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind]; and because it would thus prove to be *not* eternal [—while in reality it *is* eternal]. The isolation *(kaivalya)* of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional [and not constitutive—see §59 *a.*—] and that is Soul.*

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies.†

जडप्रकाशायोगात्प्रकाशः ॥ १४६ ॥

The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 146.—Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not shine—[it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul also were unintelligent [—as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be in *substance*—knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its *qualities*—], then there would need to be another light for *it*;—and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of light‡.

* त्रिगुणस्वभावत्वात् प्रकृतेर्न स्वभावप्रच्यवः अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। यस्यौपाधिकगुणास्तस्य कैवल्यं सम्भवति सचात्मेति ॥

† स किंरूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ जडो न प्रकाश इति सिद्धम्। यद्यात्मापि जडः स्यात्

b. And there is scripture [in support of this view:—for example the two following texts from the *Vrihadáranyaka Upanishad*]:—'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'*

c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge—] *let* Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things, but it is not essentially Intelligence. To this he replies.†

निर्गुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा ॥ १४७ ॥

Soul has no quality.

Aph. 147.—It [Soul] has not Intelligence as its attribute, because it is without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be that is associated with attributes] liable to alteration, and therefore there would be no Liberation,‡—[its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other;—or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

तस्याप्यन्येन प्रकाशेन भवितव्यं लाघवाच्चात्मैव प्रकाशरूपोऽस्तु ॥

* श्रुतिश्च । येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति ॥

† जडोऽप्यात्मास्तु चिद्धर्मा तेन जगत्प्रकाशयति न तु चिद्रूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ यद्यात्मनो धर्मयोगः स्यात् परिणामित्वं स्यात् ततश्चानिर्मोक्ष इति ॥

b. He declares that there is a contradicton to Scripture* [in the view which he is contending against].

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ १४८ ॥

Scripture higher evidence than supposed intuition.

Aph. 148.—There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by the scriptural declaration of the contrary].

a. The text—'For this Soul is un-companioned,' &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualities† [to Soul:—and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that, the fact, established by scripture, of its [i. e. soul's] being devoid of qualities, cannot be denied,—because the scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof,—i. e. the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c.,‡ [in the soul].

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥ १४९ ॥

Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.

Aph. 149.—[If soul were unintelligent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

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* श्रुतिविरोधमाह ॥

† असङ्गो ह्ययम्पुरुष इत्यादिश्रुतिर्गुणयोगे बाधिता स्यात् ॥

‡ अक्षरार्थस्तु श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य निर्गुणत्वादेर्नापलापः सम्भवति तत्प्रत्यक्षस्य गुणादिप्रत्यक्षस्य श्रुत्यैव बाधादिति ॥

a. If soul were unintelligent, then in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness—a knower. But that this is not the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon that 'I slept *pleasantly*, &c.' By the '&c' [in the aphorism] dreaming is included.*

b. The Vedántins say that 'soul is *one* only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:'—'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature *(śakti)*—i. e.—Illusion *(máyá)*,—but not through its own essence, [—to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this he says as follows.†

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ १५० ॥

There is a multiplicity of soul.

Aph. 150.—From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i. e. from their being appointed—[birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls,'—that is to say, souls are many. If soul were one only, then when *one* is born, *all* would be born, &c.‡

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* सुषुप्त्यादौ असाक्षित्वमज्ञातृत्वं स्यात् नचैवं सुखमस्वाप्समिति प्रतिभासनात्। आदिशब्दात् स्वप्नग्रहणम् ॥

† एक एवात्मेति वेदान्तिनः। तथाच नित्यः सर्वगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः। एक एव स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावत इत्यत्राह ॥

‡ जन्मादीति आदिना उपचयमरणादि गृह्यते। तद्व्यवस्थातः तन्नियमात् पुरुषबहुत्वं बहव आत्मान इत्यर्थः। यद्येक एवात्मा एकस्मिन् जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्निति ॥

b. He ponders as a doubt the opinion of the others* [—viz. of the Vedántins].

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥ १५१ ॥

The view of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 151.—[The Vedántins would have us believe that] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

a. As Space is one, [and yet] in consequence of the difference of adjuncts,—jars, &c.—when the jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said 'the jar's space is destroyed'—[for there then no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];—so also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof [—i. e. of the limitation occasioned by any particular body—], it is merely a way of talking [to say] 'The soul has perished.' [This indeed is the case] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls; otherwise, since soul is eternal [—without beginning or end—as both parties agree—], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?†

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* परमतमाशङ्कते ॥

† यथैकमाकाशं घटाद्युपाधिभेदात् घटे नष्टे घटाकाशं नष्टमिति व्यपदिश्यते तथैकात्मपक्षेऽपि देहावच्छेदभेदात् तन्नाशे आत्मा नष्ट इति व्यपदेशमात्रम्। नानात्मपक्षेऽपि अन्यथा आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् कथं जन्ममरणव्यवस्थेति ॥

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt* [as to the point in question].

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ॥ १५२ ॥

Refutation of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 152.—The investment is different [—according to the Vedántins—], but not that to which this belongs, [—and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different'—[—there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs'—i. e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body in all its multiplicity] belongs,'—is *not* different [—but is one only—]; such is the meaning. And [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else,—because this [evidence of a thing's being destroyed] would present itself where it ought not—[the destruction of Devadatta presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for *that* reason to be assumed to be dead];—and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot] belong [simultaneously] to *one*. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántin may seek to avail himself as an illustration,] are *not* contradictory, for it is not the nature of Conjunction to abide in something wholly pervaded by it†; [—whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. "What may be [proved] by this?" To this he replies.*

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्त्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥ १५३ ॥

The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

Aph. 153.—Thus [—i. e. by taking the Sánkhya view —] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as *one*.

a. 'Thus'—i. e. [if you regard the matter rightly] according to the manner here set forth,—there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, of incompatible conditions, Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul existing 'everywhere,' throughout all, as a monad.†

b. [But the Vedántin may contend]—we *see* the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as—e. g.—Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul—which is one other [than Nature]. To this he replies.‡

अन्यधर्मत्वे ऽपि नारोपात्तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥ १५४ ॥

Imputation is not proof.

Aph. 154.—Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the con-

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Left-page footnotes:

* समाधानमाह ॥

† उपाधिर्भिद्यते तद्वानुपाधिमान् न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः । नचान्यनाशादन्यत्र नाशव्यवहारो ऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । एकात्म-

Right-page footnotes:

पक्षेच व्यक्त एव विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः एकस्यबन्धमोक्षाभावात् । आकाशस्य तु धूमादियोगायोगावविरुद्धौ संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात् ॥

* एतेन किं स्यादित्यत आह ॥

† एवमुक्तरीत्या एकत्वेन परितः सर्वतो वर्त्तमानस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षादिविरुद्धधर्माणामध्यास आरोपो न भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अन्यधर्मस्याप्यन्यत्रारोपो दृष्टो यथा प्रकृतेः कर्त्तृत्वं पुरुषे ऽन्यत्रेत्यत्राह ॥

dition of another, this [—that it really possesses such—] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is *one* [absolutely simple unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is *not* an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is *not* true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death, or the like, is compatible with Soul, because it is un-companioned,* [—unattended either by qualities or by actions].

b. [But the Vedántin may say]—and thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,—for according to that—"Brahma is one without a second;—there is nothing here diverse;—death after death does he obtain who here sees as it were a multiplicity." To this he replies.†

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १५५ ॥

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

Aph. 155.—There is no opposition to the scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the *genus* [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter] to the scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul, because these [scriptural texts] refer to the *genus*. By *genus* we

* पुरुषकर्तृत्वं भ्रान्तं पुरुषाकर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् आरोपस्यासत्यत्वात् । नच सत्यासत्ययोस्सम्बन्धस्तात्त्विको भवति । असङ्गित्वादात्मनो न जन्ममरणादि सम्भवति ॥

† एवञ्च श्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् तथाचैकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति । अत्राह ॥

mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature;—and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts—] because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as *thus* indivisible];—such is the meaning.*

b. But then [—the Vedántin may rejoin—] the Bondage and Liberation are incompatible of any single soul [—and yet these may coexist according to the opinion] of him who asserts that souls are many. To this he replies.†

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्या तद्रूपम् ॥ १५६ ॥

The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

Aph. 156.—Of him [i. e. of that soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was *not* bound even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of Bondage'—viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct,—of him, 'by discerning it'—i. e. by cognizing the distinction,—there is 'that condition'—viz., the condition of isolation, [—the condition, see §145, to which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging in

* आत्मैक्यश्रुतीनां विरोधस्तु नास्ति तासां जातिपरत्वात् । जातिस्सामान्यमेकरूपत्वं । तत्रैवाद्वैतश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यात् । नाखण्डत्वं प्रयोजनाभावादित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वनेकात्मवादिनो ऽपि एकस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षौ विरुद्धावित्यत्राह ॥

the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].*

b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántin,] Bondage [—as you justly observe—] is dependent on non-perception, and is not real:—it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception:—and, on this showing, we see the [force of the] reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies.†

नान्धादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः ॥ १५७ ॥

He jeereth the Vedántin.

Aph. 157.—Nay—because the blind do not see, can those that have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What,—because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [—though *you* do not see them—]: such is the meaning.‡

b. He declares, for the following reason also, Souls are many.§

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* विदितं बन्धकारणं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकादर्शनं यस्य तस्य दृष्ट्या विवेकज्ञानेन तद्रूपं कैवल्यरूपम् ॥

† विवेकादर्शननिमित्तो बन्धो न तात्त्विकः। दर्शनाददर्शनं निवर्त्तत इति युक्तिः। एवञ्चैकात्मपक्ष एव न्यायं पश्यामो न नानात्मक इत्यत्राह ॥

‡ अन्धो न पश्यतीति किं चक्षुष्मानपि नोपलभते। नानात्मवादिनामनेके न्यायास्सन्तीत्यर्थः ॥

§ इतो ऽपि नानात्मान इत्याह ॥

वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् ॥ १५८ ॥

Scripture proof that Souls are many.

Aph. 158.—Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] the non-duality [asserted in the same scriptures] is not [a fact,—if we are to understand it in the sense of the Vedántins].

a. In the Puránas, &c., we hear—"Vámadeva has been liberated," "Suka has been liberated," and so on. If Soul were *one*, since the liberation of all would take place on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory.*

b. [But the Vedántin may rejoin]—on the theory that Souls are many,—since the world has been from eternity [without beginning], and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees *all* having been liberated, there should be a universal void:—but on the theory that Soul is *one*, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct—[which, the Vedántin flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya]. To this he replies.†

अनादावद्ययावदभावाद्भविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १५९ ॥

As it has been, so will it be.

Aph. 159.—Though it [—the world—] has been from eternity, since

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* पुराणादौ श्रुतं वामदेवो मुक्तश्शुको मुक्त इत्यादि। यद्येक एवात्मा एकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तेर्भेदश्रुतिबाधः स्यात् ॥

† नानात्मपक्षे ऽनादौ संसारे कदापि को ऽपि मुच्यते इति क्रमेण सर्वमुक्तौ सर्वशून्यता स्यात् एकात्मपक्षे तु उपाधिविगम एव मोक्ष इत्यत्राह ॥

there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation* [of *all* Souls, so as to leave a void].

b. He states another solution of the difficulty.†

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः॥ १६०॥

The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

Aph. 160.—As now [things are, so] everywhere [will they continue to go on;—hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence] a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,—i. e. in time to come also,—there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short [of the world], since of this the on-flowing is eternal.‡

b. On the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§158. *b.*], we should find a universal void,—so that the

* अनादौ संसारे ऽद्य यावच्छून्यताया अदर्शनात् भविष्यति मुक्तिरिति पक्षे नास्ति प्रमाणम्॥

† समाधानान्तरमाह॥

‡ अनन्तत्वादात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तिरपि स्यात् संसारोच्छेदो ऽपि न स्यात्। इदानीमिव सर्वत्र भविष्यत्काले ऽपि मुक्तिर्भविष्यतीति नात्यन्तोच्छेदो ऽस्य प्रवाहनित्यत्वात्॥

doubt is alike [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when [the fruit of] works —this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body is its adjunct—] came to an end, the world would be void* [on the Vedánta theory as well as on the Sánkhya one].

c. Now—[if the Vedántin says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number] endless; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too;—for therefore, while those get liberated who become knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different], there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.†

d. Pray [—some one may ask—] is Soul essentially bound or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation;—for if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul] would [cease with the cessation of its essence and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation, and the like, [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation] is unmeaning. To this he replies.‡

* उपाधिविगमो मोक्ष इति पक्षे ऽपि सर्वशून्यताप्रसङ्ग इति तुल्यो ऽनुयोगः। यथा नानात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तौ सर्वोच्छेदः तथा कर्मोच्छेदे सर्वोपाधिनाशाज्जगच्छून्यं स्यात्॥

† अथोपाधीनामनन्तत्वान्न शून्यता नानात्मपक्षे ऽपि तुल्यमत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु सन्ततं ब्रह्माण्डजीवलोकानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता॥

‡ किमात्मा बद्धो मुक्तो वा। बद्धत्वे स्वरूपस्याप्रच्यवादनिर्मोक्षः प्रच्यवे ऽनित्यत्वम्। मुक्तत्वे व्यर्थो ध्यानादिरित्यत आह॥

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः ॥ १६१ ॥

Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 161.—It [Soul] is altogether free, [but seemingly] multiform [through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free; [see §19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom] is effected by meditation, &c.,* [which are therefore not unmeaning, as alleged in §160. *d*].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness [—some one may object—] even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there is no Liberation,—[Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but something *combined* with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies.†

अक्षसम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वम् ॥ १६२ ॥

How Soul is a spectator.

Aph. 162.—It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense-organs [—which quit it on Liberation].

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connection therewith, it [Soul] is a witness;—and where is its connection with sense-organs [—these products of Nature—see §62—]

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* न बद्धो नायं मुच्यते किन्तु नित्यमुक्तः । अज्ञाननाशस्तु ध्यानादिना क्रियत इति ॥

† आत्मनस्साक्षित्वमुक्तम् । प्राप्तविवेकस्यापि साक्षित्वे ऽनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत आह ॥

when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?*

b. [Well—some one may ask—] at all times of *what* nature is Soul? To this he replies.†

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १६३ ॥

The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 163.—[The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom,'—that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [—see §1 and 19—], because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understanding‡—[which —see §62—is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १६४ ॥

Soul's indifference.

Aph. 164.—And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant inaction. The word *iti* [rendered 'finally'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.§

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* अक्षमिन्द्रियं तत्सम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वं विवेके च क्वेन्द्रियसम्बन्ध इति ॥

† सर्वदा किंरूप आत्मेत्यत आह ॥

‡ नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदैव दुःखाख्यबन्धशून्यत्वं दुःखादेर्बुद्धिपरिणामत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ औदासीन्यमकर्तृत्वम् । इतिशब्दः पुरुषधर्मप्रतिपादनसमाप्तौ ॥

b. [Some one may say]—the fact of Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture:—how is this [—if, as you say, it be *not* an agent]? To this he replies.*

उपरागात्कर्त्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥ १६५ ॥

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such.

Aph. 165.—Its [—Soul's—fancy of] being an agent is from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

a. Its 'being an agent'—i. e. its Soul's *fancy* of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,'—i. e. from the influence of Nature† [—see §19—of which Intellect—see §62—is a modification].

b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion:—for thus do we see [practised] in the scriptures,‡—[e. g. where it is said in the Veda—"Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again"].

c. So much, in this commentary on Kapila's aphorisms delaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book—that on the [topics or] object-matter§ [of the Sánkhya system].

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* आत्मनः कर्त्तृत्वं श्रूयते तत्कथमित्यत आह ॥

† चित्सान्निध्येन प्रकृत्युपरागादात्मनः कर्त्तृत्वं कर्त्तृत्वाभिमानः ॥

‡ चित्सान्निध्यादिति वीप्सा परिसमाप्तौ । श्रुतौ तथा दृष्टत्वादिति ॥

§ इति कापिलसांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रवृत्तौ विषयाध्यायः प्रथमः ॥

END OF BOOK I.

GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL ... MADRAS